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 This paper answers the question, has the administrative state been able to adhere to 
constitutional principles as it expanded? The principles of popular sovereignty, limited 
government, separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism 
are embedding within the Constitution.1 To adhere to these constitutional principles, there 
must be citizen representation, transparency, and accountability.  Dwight Waldo had 
concerns that the federal administration as outlined by Woodrow Wilson would need to 
function in the spirit of democracy.  This paper will look at how the fundamental principles 
of representation, transparency, and accountability apply in the modern bureaucratic state.  
      The three chapters investigate different aspects of the federal bureaucracy.  First, does 
the federal bureaucracy display political bias? If there is political bias, then the 
constitutional principle of citizen representation is absent.  Multiple cases are presented in 
which agencies have been cited for political bias. 
     Federal agencies produce far more regulations than Congress does. Who are the 
bureaucrats?   Are the people voices being heard in the policy making process?  The policy 
making process can be influenced in various ways.  If unelected bureaucrats are making 
the regulations, the American people have no real pathway to hold them accountable.  
    Most federal agencies are outsourcing to get expertise needed to fulfill their mission.  As 
more government services have become privatized, this has led to constitutional conflicts. 
 
1 Constitutional Principles, Bill of Rights Institute.  https://billofrightsinstitute.org/ accessed Aug 3, 2021. 
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The principles of accountability, oversight, and transparency are found to be lacking in 
areas where government privatization is utilized.    
    In the polarized political atmosphere of today, there is little chance of reforming 
Congress.  But if congressional reform were possible, it could hold the members to their 
constitutional responsibility to make the legislation of the land and stop authorizing federal 
bureaucrats to develop regulations.  To address the lack of constitutional structure an 
amendment to the Constitutions is necessary.  Although a arduous process, it has been 
accomplished twenty-seven times in the history of the Nation when dire situations arose.  
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Is There Political bias in the Administrative State? 
    In the late 19th century prior to his presidency Woodrow Wilson was focused in the 
world of academia.  He had studied European models of public administration.   This 
experience would help provide the underpinnings of what would become Wilson’s theory 
of public administration.  The United States had changed dramatically since the time of 
the Founder’s. By the late 1870’s the United States society had become more complex.   
Woodrow Wilson advocated for the science of administration.2   The administration as he 
saw it would be able to conduct the business of the federal government.     He thought that 
the responsibility of the government in his modern complex time would require ‘wisdom, 
knowledge, and experience” to have authority over corporations.3 The 454 agencies that 
comprise the federal bureaucracy oversee many aspects of Americans’ lives.4   
      This paper will look at the administrative state as it is in the 21st century and how it 
functions today. The modern federal bureaucracy will be compared to the standard of 
nonpartisanship as outlined by Woodrow Wilson in the late 1880’s.  His theory of public 
administration was based upon the administrators being experts in their field and being 
free from partisan influence. The focus of this paper will be the federal bureaucracies and 
has it been able to maintain political neutrality as emphasized by Woodrow Wilson.  This 
will be accomplished by looking at what the administrative state was like, what took place 
in some widely accepted times of expansion, and how it functions now in the 21st century. 
 
2 Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887):  198. 
3 Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887):  199. 
4 Federal Register accessed July 23,2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies.  
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The paper will discuss a variety of scholarly views that both support and oppose the 
administrative state.  The goal of this paper is not to argue the legality of the administrative 
state although, I think it is important to understand those arguments.  But rather I will 
evaluate if the federal administrative agencies have been able to maintain political 
neutrality.  For federal agencies to undertake the task of regulating labor relations, 
providing industry safety standards, and the conservation of natural resources the 
fundamental principle of political neutrality was paramount, according to Wilson.  Is the 
administrative bureaucracy of the 21st century politically neutral? 
History of the Administrative State 
   Wilson’s writings while in academia were on developing the study of public 
administration into a science that researched and applied to modern society. He had been 
influenced by European models of public administration that he had observed and read 
about.5  He gave praise to Frederic the Great of Prussia and Napoleon in France for their 
great achievements in reorganizing the public administrations of their perspective 
countries.6 In the late 1800’s the United States society was becoming much more 
urbanized.  The population was growing. Wilson wrote, “There is scarcely a single duty 
of government, which was once simple which, is not now complex.7 This modern state 
would have its own personality. The models he studied were from the French and German.  
Each of these countries had been able to adapt a model of public administration their form 
of centralized government. How would that adaptation look in the United States?  Wilson 
 
5 Ronald Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism.  (Lanham, Maryland:  Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishing, 2005). 
6 Woodrow Wilson. “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887): 5-7. 
7 Woodrow Wilson. “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887): 199. 
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wrote, “to answer our purposes, it must be adapted, not to a simple and compact, but to a 
complex and multiform state, and made to fit highly decentralized form of government.”8 
     He acknowledged that mankind had evolved through the centuries from a feudal 
system into monarchy.  From monarchy, societies had advanced to representative 
governments.  But he did not believe that the American people had the intellect to make 
rational decisions about how their government should function.   Society had entered a 
time when an intellectual approach to governmental function should be applied instead of 
the sentiments and principles outlined by the Founding Fathers.  
     The Constitution as written by the Founders does not address how a federal 
administration would be structured or regulated.  Wilson thought the Founder’s had taken 
the task of dealing with the circumstances of the time.  He believed that the Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence needed to be re-analyzed by a new view of the 
world.9 A world that was  much more industrialized nation than during the Founders time. 
The population had grown since the Founders.  In a speech in 1911 when discussing his 
view of the Declaration of Independence Wilson is quoted, “If you want to understand the 
real Declaration of Independence, do not repeat the preface.”10 In his July 4th address in 
1914, then President Wilson again shares that the Declaration of Independence was a 
 
8 Woodrow Wilson. “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887):  200. 
9 Ronald Pestritto.  “Woodrow Wilson:  The Godfather of Liberalism,” July 21, 2012, 
https://www.heritage.org/node/12232/print-display#_ftnref1   
10 Woodrow Wilson, “An Address to the Jefferson Club in Los Angeles,” May 12, 1911, in The Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson, 69 vols., ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966–1993), 
Vol. 23, pp. 33–34. 
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document primarily of war and “not the business of our day, for the matter with which it 
deals is past.”11 
     Prior to his presidency, Wilson developed a theory of public administration.  In the Art 
of Governing, Wilson outlined his theory of public administration.12 His theory was very 
progressive for the time.  Wilson believed that the Constitution was an article of the past.  
Society had grown beyond anything that the Founders could have imagined.  Wilson 
writes “The period of constitution-making is passed now.  We have reached a new territory 
in which we need new guides, the vast territory of administration.”13 
  This perceived short-sightedness of the Founders had left the roadblocks to the public 
administration that the United States needed in the modern times of Woodrow Wilson.  
The separation of powers as outlined in the Constitution would be a hinderance to his 
theory.  The United States as he saw it had outgrown the Constitution. Wilson’s 
examination of the constitutional history of other nations, he believed that there were three 
stages of growth that governments encounter. First was the period of absolute ruler.14  
During this period there would be an administrative apparatus that functioned with the 
absolute ruler.  Second was the period in which countries would form a constitution to 
overcome the absolute ruler.  In this period, there would be no administration system, 
because the focus would on overcoming the absolute ruler period. The third period was 
the time the nation would develop a new constitution that would embrace a new 
 
11 Woodrow Wilson, Address at Independence Hall: “The Meaning of Liberty.”  The American Presidency 
Project.  Https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.address-at-independence-hall.  Accessed Aug 4, 2021. 
12Woodrow Wilson, “The Art of Governing,” Nov 1885, in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 5, p 
52. Ed. William Baker and Ray Stannard (1970). 
13 Woodrow Wilson, “The Art of Governing,” Nov 1885, In the Public Paper of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 5, p 
52. Ed William Baker and Ray Stannard (1970).  
14Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887):  7. 
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administrative system.   Public administration as he saw it should be outside the realm of 
the constitutional guidelines.    
    Other progressive thinkers of the time had similar views as Wilson.  Frank Goodnow 
was one of these scholars.  Prior to Wilson being elected president in 1913, Goodnow one 
of Wilson’s mentors and colleague. Goodnow wrote about the need for a government 
administration.15 Like Wilson, he believed that the dedication to the Constitution and the 
Founder’s view of protecting individual rights was outdated.  The government needed to 
be adjusted to allow an administrative structure to provide a wide array of affairs that had 
become apparent in the nation. Goodnow believed that there needed to be a public 
administration system within the federal government.  But like Wilson, he believed that 
the constraints of the Constitution could be a stumbling block.  Goodnow states, “of the 
United States Supreme Court, to what extent the Constitution of the United States in its 
present form is a bar to the adoption of the most important social reform measures”. 16  
     Wilson was sworn in as President in March of 1913.  He wasted no time implementing 
his progressive theory of public administration into action in the federal government.  The 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was signed by Wilson in December of that year. The 
following year, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was signed by Wilson.   
Woodrow Wilson served as President until 1921.  During his tenure Wilson enacted many 
social reforms that protected women, children, and labor workers. He signed Revenue Act 
of 1913 to reduce tariffs and authorize income tax17.  Each of these pieces of legislation 
 
15 Frank Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution, (New York:  Macmillan, 1911), p311-365. 
16Frank Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution, (New York:  Macmillan, 1911), p 270.  
17 Ambar, Saladin.  Woodrow Wilson:  Domestic Affairs.  University of Virginia.  www.millercenter.org  
accessed July 22, 2021. 
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expanded the federal bureaucracy by employing workers and administrators to enforce 
and oversee the implementation of the new legislation. 
     Concerns about how to reconcile the growing bureaucracy arose.   Dwight Waldo was 
also concerned that the administrative experts were themselves a political force. He wrote 
that the dichotomy of public administration and politics is false.18 Waldo reflected on 
Wilson’s earlier writing directed towards “experts” that would be best suited to rule.19 But 
beyond the experts being educated, there was no further suggestion of specifically what 
other characteristics they should employ. Although Waldo agreed in the need for public 
administration, he did not clearly agree with how Wilson’s theory was unfolding within 
the structure of the federal government.  He believed that although someone could claim 
to be an expert in their field, this did not provide any assurance of political neutrality. 
There was the notion that the experts should be nonpolitical. How would that be defined?  
     Waldo describes politics within the government and administration as firstly, the will 
of the state being determined.  Secondly, the administration would provide the expression 
of that will.  If there was not harmony between these two ideals it would paralyze the 
government.  If you could not guarantee impartiality how much power should an 
administrator have?  
     For the government to function efficiently, the administration would be required to be 
influenced by the political will of the state.  But the administration could not be under the 
influence of the experts from within the bureaucracy.  If both where influencing the 
 
18Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public 
Administration, (New York:  The Ronald Press Company, 1948), 108 
19Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly, (July 1887):  197-222. 
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expression of state policy the agencies would not function properly.  If the administration 
is to function legitimately, the political control must come externally from the state. There 
must be an objective non-administrative management of the government policies.  
Political influence of the expression of the will the government from the administrative 
experts would create disharmony.   There are scholars that have concerns of greater 
magnitude than perceived disharmony. One such author is Sidney Milkis. 
    Sidney Milkis wrote in The President and the Parties:  The Transformation of the 
American Party System Since the New Deal that FDR’s New Deal expansion of the 
administrative state was a direct plan to transformation of the United States government.20   
He argues that FDR took the administrative law making from Congress and partisan 
politics and placed it largely in the hands of the President. He did this by transforming the 
Democratic party. He had successfully removed the power of the Democratic Party 
leadership and placed in his own hands.  By doing so, he also redefined the President as a 
position of power.  Milkis believes this maneuver by FDR liberated the executive branch 
from the grips of Congressional politics to the extent that he controlled the party. It 
provided FDR with a means to exert his political power on congressmen of the Democratic 
party during the legislative process. This maneuver strengthened the executive office.   
     The growing administrative state now was under the partisan politics of the sitting 
President.   There would be no means to maintain nonpartisanship within the 
administrative state that was directly under the rule of the partisan president.21 The experts 
 
20Sidney Milkis, The President and the Parties:  The Transformation of the American Party System Since 
the New Deal,  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993), 11-51. 
21 Sidney Milkis, The President and the Parties:  The Transformation of the American Party System Since 
the New Deal, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1993), 11-51. 
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that were placed in the bureaucratic positions would surely be selected because of their 
support to the President’s agenda.  Milkis saw the New Deal administrative expansion as 
the means for FDR to redesign the fundamentals of the federal government from 
Jeffersonian government to a progressive administrative state. 
      Pestritto’s view of President Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal has some 
similarities with Milkis.22 But Pestritto was concerned that if bureaucrats were truly free 
from political control as suggested by Woodrow Wilson, how could they be held 
accountable by the people they served.  So, the protective layer of political neutrality 
proposed by Wilson could be perceived as a hindrance to a representative government 
according to Pestritto.  The “idea of separating politics and administration-of grounding a 
significant portion of the government not on the basis of popular consent but on expertise 
-was a fundamental aim of American Progressivism and explains the Progressives’ fierce 
assault on the Founders’ separation-of-powers constitutionalism.”23 Other scholars focus 
on what they perceive as the unconstitutionality of the federal bureaucracy.  
      Hamburger writes that the American administrative state lacks regulation of career 
bureaucrats by citizen consent.24 His fundamental argument is that the administrative state 
as an entity is unconstitutional by design. Hamburger’s view is the federal bureaucracy as 
presently structured makes it virtually impossible to maintain neutrality.  Among his 
arguments, Hamburger describes a common situation in which administrative judges that 
 
 22Ronald Pestritto, “The Birth of the Administrative State:  Where It came from and What It Means for 
Limited Government.”  First Principal Series, no. 16 (Nov 2007).  
23 Ronald Pestritto, “The Birth of the Administrative State:  Where It came from and What It Means for 
Limited Government.”  First Principal Series, no. 16 (Nov 2007), 5. 




are employed by the federal agencies adjudicate cases that arise from regulations that were 
implemented by the agency’s administrators. His concern is that administrative judges 
who are employed by federal agencies to review these cases are less likely to adjudicate 
against their employer. The impartiality that comes from the rule of law is abandoned. 
             John Marini reiterates this same point of contention.25 Marini states that political 
neutrality in career bureaucrats is delusion thinking of what he calls the ‘universal class, 
the bureaucracy.’26 They will insist that they are impartial, but then act in partisan ways.  
His concern is that they cannot see their own personal bias.   They have become so 
imbedded in their administrative institutions that they are blinded to their own lack of 
impartiality. Marini writes, “In the last two decades, it has become clear that the 
bureaucracy can no longer be understood, or justified, in term of its neutrality.27The 
bureaucracy itself has become its greatest defender.      
      In The Bureaucrat Kings, The Origins and Underpinnings of the American 
Bureaucratic State Paul Moreno views the administrative state as having potential for 
tyranny.  This author provides a history of the development of the administrative state in 
four waves.  He entwines each wave with the political consequences of the time.  This 
author uses the term such ‘scandalously irresponsible” when discussing the process of 
Congress passing vague laws and expecting bureaucrats to define and implement their 
interpretation of the law.28Moreno provides some thoughts into methods to rectify the 
 
25John Marini, Unmasking the Administrative State, The Crisis of American Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century.  ed. Ken Masugi (New York:  Encounter Books, 2019), 43-81. 
26John Marini, Unmasking the Administrative State, The Crisis of American Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century.  ed. Ken Masugi (New York:  Encounter Books, 2019), 8.  
27 John Marini, Unmasking the Administrative State, The Crisis of American Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century.  ed. Ken Masugi (New York:  Encounter Books, 2019),57. 
28 Paul Moreno, The Bureaucrat King, (Santa Barbara: Praeger 2017), 151. 
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administrative state of the twenty-first century by returning to the basics of the 
Constitution.  He admits that reform is not possible without the cooperation of Congress.  
      Dobkin’s work provides a different point of view.29 He focuses on the administrative 
state of 1970-1990.  He believes that the federal bureaucracy has become so large and 
abusive that it makes oversight impossible.  There is no way of assuring nonbiased 
administrative regulations.  The concern of lack of neutrality is compounded by the 
presidents of modern times being so proficient at writing executive orders.  From Dobkin’s 
view, the American people cannot be protected from politically motivated bureaucrats.  
The bureaucrats in turn cannot be protected from the partisan politics of the executive 
branch. But not all scholars share the same concerns as the aforementioned authors.  
     Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule are two scholars that defend the bureaucratic 
state.30 Both authors do not view the administrative state as any threat to the livelihood of 
America.   Instead, in their view, it is an essential arm of the government to serve the  
people.  They both believe that there should be broad discretion handed to the federal 
bureaucracy to manage the safety and wellbeing of citizen.  
 
 
Executive Partisan Influence 
        Political bias can be internally from the personal political bias of the career 
bureaucrats themselves or externally from of a partisan president.   If the political 
 
29 Donald Dobkin, “The Rise of the Administrative State:  A Prescription of Lawlessness.”  Kansas Journal 
of Law & Public Policy XVII, no. 3 (May 2008):  362-385. 
30 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Law & Leviathan Redeeming the Administrative State (Cambridge, 
Mass:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 5-8. 
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influence is from the President by means of executive orders this warrants a closer look at 
the federal register.  Woodrow Wilson while President signed 1803 executive orders.31  
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed 3728 executive orders.  Barack Obama signed 276 executive 
orders.  Donald Trump to date has signed 169 executive orders.  Each of these executive 
orders has the potential to influence the regulations produced by the administrative state, 
how a regulation is implemented, or how an agency function.  In recent years both 
Presidents Obama and Trump have signed executive orders that directly impacted the 
function of the administrative state.  
      President Trump in October 2019 signed executive order 13891.32This executive 
prevents the use of guidance documents as a means of bureaucrats to privately alter federal 
regulation to overreach their scope. Guidance documents are utilized by federal agencies 
to rules, laws, or procedures. President Trump signed this executive order he believes to 
protect the American citizens from regulatory overreach. This executive order prevents 
guidance documents from becoming legally binding because they do not go through the 
rulemaking process as outlined by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  It places a 
roadblock in how federal administrative law is managed.  This action would hold steady 
 
31  United States Federal Register National Archives accessed July 13, 2020, 
https://www.federalregister.gov. 




with President Trumps conservative political view of deregulation.33,34 Trump had made 
deregulation as part of his campaign platform while running for executive office.  
     In January 2011, President Obama signed executive order 13563 which outlined a plan 
for federal agencies under presidential control to retrospectively review regulations.  This 
executive order required federal agencies to review existing regulations if they should be 
updated or even removed. In this executive order President Obama clearly defines what 
he sees as the role and responsibility of federal bureaucracy.  His order opening comment 
is “Our regulatory system must protect public health, welfare, safety, and our 
environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job 
creation.”35 Over the next two years federal agencies issued and additional 225 new rules 
under the retrospective review executive order.36 This executive order and the 
subsequent consequences of it would affirm President Obama’s progressive view 
towards the public administrative function of the federal government.   These examples 
show presidential partisan politics utilizing the federal bureaucracy to meet their desires. 
          In The State of the Administrative State:  The Regulatory Impact of the Trump 
Administration, Professor Kathy Wagner-Hill describes a modern federal bureaucracy that 
 
33 Law and Justice, Executive Order on Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance 
Documents, 
Accessed July 13, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-
promoting-rule-law-improved-agency-guidance-documents/ 
34 Keith Belton and John Graham, “Deregulation Under Trump.”  Cato Institute, Summer 2020.  
https://www.cato.org    accessed Aug 3, 2021. 
35 The White House President Barack Obama accessed July 14, 2020, https://whitehousearchives.gov. 





is being utilized for political purposes and in a state of chaos.37 She writes of a twenty-
first century administrative state that is clearly influenced and a consequence of 
presidential politics. Wagner-Hill states that Congressional politics, the executive branch, 
and the Supreme Court all impact how the federal agencies function.  In her article, she 
focuses on President Trumps administration and concerns about the impact of his attempts 
to deregulate.  The impact of partisan influence of federal agencies can be profound on 
social, economic, and environmental topics. Presidents of the twenty-first century have 
devised methods to influence and control what policies are developed and how they are 
implemented by federal agencies.  The dysfunctional political force described in Professor 
Wagner-Hill’s article is unrecognizable by any standards set forth by Woodrow Wilson 
and Frank Goodnow.  Instead of being a politically benign entity that does the work of the 
government, the federal bureaucracy of the 21st century has become a sought after 
commodity to be harnessed for political gains by either political party.  
Bias from Within 
      Another area to be studied when investigating if the federal bureaucracy of the twenty-
first century is politically neutral would be from within the various agencies themselves. 
A study published in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory researched 
the political views of government employees.38  In this study, the authors extrapolated 
data from National Election Study that had gathered data from 1982, 1984, and 1986 
elections.  This study compared government employees compared to the private sector in 
 
37  Wagner-Hill, Kathy.  “The State of the Administrative State:  The Regulatory Impact of the Trump 
Administration.”  Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review 6, no. 1 (2019).  
38 James Garand, Catherine Parkhurst, and Rusanne Seoud. 1991. “Bureaucrats, Policy Attitudes, and 
Political Behavior:  Extension of the Bureau Voting Model of Government Growth.”  Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 1, no. 2 (April 1991):  177-212. 
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voting behaviors and attitudes.  The outcome found three specific points: 1) government 
employees have a more liberal ideology and views about spending 2) government 
employees have a higher rate of turnout for voting 3) lastly, government employees are 
less likely to support republican candidates.   Point two of these findings would support 
John Marini’s theory that career bureaucrats have a survival instinct to preserve their 
careers.39   Point three of this study can be seen clearly in data gathered by Rothman and 
Lichter.40 Data in this research study showed that government employees that self-identify 
as liberal are more likely to vote democrat.  The percentage of bureaucrats that favor the 
Democratic party is more than the percentage of democrats in the general population.    
     In reports released by Government Executive shows that of government employees 
that donated to the 2016 election, ninety-five percent donated to the democratic 
candidate.41 Over 2 million dollars was donated in 2016 by federal employees from 
fourteen agencies.  Five percent of those donations went to a republican candidate.   For 
thoroughness, this paper must examine personal political actions from within the 
workplace.  
    The Hatch Act was enacted in 1939 and amended in 1990 to limit certain political 
activities for federal employees.   The purpose was to ensure “federal programs were 
administered in a nonpartisan fashion”.42 It also protected federal employees from 
 
39 John Marini, Unmasking the Administrative State, The Crisis of American Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century.  ed. Ken Masugi (New York:  Encounter Books, 2019), 43-81. 
40 Stan Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, “How Liberal are Bureaucrats?”  accessed July 13, 2020.  
www.cato.org 
41 Eric Katz, “Federal Employees are Donating Almost Exclusively to Hillary Clinton.” Accessed July 12, 
2020. 
www.govexec.com 
42 Hatch Act Overview.  U.S. Office of Special Counsel.  accessed July 26,2020,  www.osc.gov.  
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political coercion, and ensure employees advanced in the workplace due to merit and not 
political affiliation.  The Office of Special Counsel handles reported Hatch Act violations.   
     The number of reported Hatch Act violations has declined although not steadily from 
2008-2018.  In 2008, the Office of Special Counsel reported 445 new complaints that 
year.43 In 2018 there were 263 new complaints.  Warning letters were sent to 49 
employees.  Five employees withdrew from partisan races and two employees resigned. 
Although there is a large decrease in new Hatch Act complaints, these numbers are still 
in stark contrast to referrals from 2000.  In 2000 there were 98 new complaints.  These 
new complaints resulted in twenty-one warning letters and four disciplinary actions.  The 
sharp decline2008 to 2018 could be a direct result of federal employee workshops on the 
implications of the Hatch Act. Senator Akaka states there appears to be a discrepancy on 
how White House appointees are handled versus civil servants.44  In his testimony, Senator 
Akaka states that the President is not motivated to reprimand any White House appointees 
that may have been reported for Hatch Act violations.   
     Hatch Act violations can vary in levels of severity. Infractions can be the result of 
wearing a political button on clothing, attempting to obtain partisan political funding, to 
utilizing federal employees for specific partisan political campaigns.  In 2017 the U.S. 
Postal Service (USPS) was found to be in violation of the Hatch Act.  The USPS colluded 
with the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) to endorse and support a specific 
2016 presidential candidate.   The USPS and NALC worked together to choose which 
 
43 Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2008. Accessed July 26,2020, www.osc.gov.   
44 Hearing before the Oversight of Government Management, The Federal Workforce, and the District of 
Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United 
States Senate. Accessed July 26, 2020.  http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate.  
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candidate to endorse.  The USPS allowed carriers to use “union official” leave for 
campaign activities.  The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) found that these activities 
had led to institutional bias in favor of the NALC’s chosen candidate.  
     OSC in 2018 found an Administrative Judge for the Department of Justice Immigration 
violated the Hatch Act by promoting presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s proposed 
immigration plan during a hearing.  She was also reported for advocating against the 
Republican Party’s immigration plan.45 
     This year, Kellyanne Conway in her position as Counsel to the President was found to 
have violated the Hatch Act.  She appeared in her official role during interviews on 
television.  During the interviews, she advocated against a specific Senate candidate.  
During the same interview, she publicly supported another candidate. In this case Mrs. 
Conway is a presidential appointee to the White House and the direct authority of the 
President.  Violations by White House appointees’ defaults to the President’s prerogative.  
        What are the implications of this data in the function of federal agencies? A close 
look at public documents and available research provides a telling story about political 
bias from within specific federal agencies. 
Internal Revenue Service 
In 2010 allegations were brought to light that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Determination Unit was targeting conservative organizations tax-exempt status for 
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review.46 The allegations were that the IRS was politically targeting Tea Party and other 
conservative organizations by specifically placing them on a “Be on the Look Out” 
(BOLO) list. It is reported that the Supervisor of the Determinations Unit ask IRS 
specialist to place the Tea Party on the BOLO list. It is alleged that between 2010-2012 
the IRS changed the criteria “for identifying potential political cases.”47 A report released 
in May 2013 by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) states, 
“Early in Calendar Year 2010, the IRS began using inappropriate criteria to identify 
organizations applying for tax-exempt status to review for indications of significant 
political campaign intervention.”48 The audit by TIGTA found that supervisors at the IRS 
had ask their agents to not only utilize inappropriate criteria that identified for review 
organizations based upon their policy positions, but that they also allowed the 
inappropriate criteria to remain in place for more than 18 months.  
     The IRS Determinations Unit also created delays in the process for targeted 
organizations by requesting unnecessary information. Many organizations that had been 
requested to provide more information had received cumbersome questionnaire or even 
required to provide lists of past and future donors. All these interventions by IRS agents 
were utilized to delay or deter politically conservative organizations from obtaining tax-
exempt status.  
 
46 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-
Exempt Applications for Review.  May 14,2013. Ref. 2013-10-053.  http://www.treasury.gov/tigta 
47 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-
Exempt Applications for Review.  May 14,2013. Ref. 2013-10-053.  http://www.treasury.gov/tigta. 
48 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-
Exempt Applications for Review.  May 14,2013. Ref. 2013-10-053.  http://www.treasury.gov/tigta. 
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     In 2013, at the time of the report, the TIGTA found that the IRS had not fully 
implemented the corrective recommendations that had been suggested. The TIGTA also 
found that there were still multiple applications open for review for over 3 years and 
through 2 election cycles. The TIGTA recommendations based upon this investigation 
where methods to document better, initiate a process to track applications, and train 
employees before election cycles. 
 
                                                   Central Intelligence Agency 
     The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as with all federal agencies has had a strict 
policy to maintain political neutrality.  Sherman Kent wrote, “Proper relationship between 
intelligence producers and consumers is one of utmost delicacy.  Intelligence must be 
close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have greatest amount of guidance, and 
must not be so close that is loses its objectivity and integrity of judgement.”49 A closer 
look at the modern-day CIA does not always portray these standards.  Unfortunately for 
the CIA there have been areas where political bias has influenced and altered the accuracy 
of information assimilated by consultants working for the agency.  
   Gentry identifies two methods of the intelligence community being politicized.50First is 
when intelligence officials “cook the books” in ways to further personal political or 
bureaucratic interest. A second method occurs when forces from the outside try to utilize 
intelligence information selectively to directly affect political policies.  One consultant 
 
49 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University 
Press, 1949), 180. 
50 Robert Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization.”  Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 36, No.5(1992), 5-13. 
19 
 
reported that he withheld important details in his analysis because he had been concerned 
that the information might be used against the Presidents administration that he 
supported.51 This analyst was asked to analyze strategic failures that had taken place 
during the Carter administration pertaining to the overthrow the Shah of Iran. His analysis 
had found policy failures within the Carter administration had been partially at fault.  The 
analyst was concerned that if his report were leaked, it would damage President Carter. 
So, he deleted the most damaging information. A former senior official at the CIA states 
that analysts would choose to omit details because they felt they were under political 
pressures.  This practice became known as politicizing by omitting.   
     One of the fundamentals of the CIA is for intelligence personnel to remain politically 
neutral.  Gentry notes that in the history of the CIA there has never been such overt public 
display of bias the likes of the presidential election of 2016. Retired senior CIA officials 
became very vocal about their support of candidate Hillary Clinton and their distaste for 
candidate Donald Trump.  The attacks were at times directed toward President elect 
Trump.  Other attacks were through leaks.52Has this partisan political bias permeated the 
bureau? Both James Clapper and John Brennan who were Directors of intelligence 
agencies until retirement in 2017 have repeatedly attacked President Trump.  Another 
display of political bias within the CIA came in 2004 by a senior analyst who was 
disheartened about the outcome of the presidential election.53 She admitted to leaking 
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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, (2018) 31:  648. 
53 John Gentry, “A New Form of Politicization? Has the CIA Become Institutionally Biased or Politicized?”, 
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classified documents about the CIA’s methods of interrogation in hopes of damaging 
President Bush’s administration.  
Environmental Protection Agency 
    A study done at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2017 was designed to 
investigate motivations of the participants who develop policy.54 These authors found that 
the regulatory development process in this case was being politicized.  First, they found 
there were personal policy agendas at work.  Second, there was politicization of the 
regulatory process by what the authors call the “science charades.”55 This is stating 
scientific evidence that is not accurate, but rather a means to present policy preference as 
science.  Although this study revealed concerns about the credibility of science being put 
at risk, the underlying politicizing of the regulatory process by these methods is disturbing.   
     The point of reviewing this data is not to declare that one political party or the other is 
superior.   But rather to take a clear look at the potential bias from within the bureaucracy 
as well as from executive orders signed by the President.  
     The data and examples provided in this chapter do not imply that all federal agencies 
and civil servants are politically bias.  The cases discussed are but a few from the available 
literature.   They are enough to understand that reform is needed.  Congress must have a 
better grasp on regulating the administrative state.   
 
54 Susan Dudley and Marcus Peacock, Improving Regulatory Science, A Case Study of the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards, George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, June 30, 2017, 
p 41. 
55 Susan Dudley and Marcus Peacock, Improving Regulatory Science, A Case Study of the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards, George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, June 30, 2017, 
p 44.  
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    Although you cannot remove personal political opinion from federal employees, there 
must be a pathway to prevent opinion from becoming bias that is threaded within the fiber 
of policy development or agency implementation.  What might reform look like? 
Possible Reform 
    Reforms must be implemented to prevent personal political biases from influencing 
public policy formation.   The underlying philosophy of how to reform the federal 
bureaucracy will be based upon accepting the need for the services provided by federal 
agencies, or not.  The federal bureaucracy oversees the safety of American food supply, 
national security, ensures safe labor practice, and environmental protection.  The list of 
services provided by the administrative state are too vast to describe in a short paper.  It 
seems incomprehensible to simply stop providing those services and safety measures.  It 
may be possible to either defer some of the services provided by the federal government 
to the states or privatize them.  Either of these methods would require tremendous 
planning and coordination between Congress, federal agencies, and the individual states.  
     If the administrative agencies are to remain within the federal government, an 
administrative constitution could be an option to form the reconciliation procedure that 
Waldo found to be lacking.  Within the framework of reform, the bureaucracy must be 
constitutionalized to provide legitimacy and proper oversight of the federal agencies.  
Otherwise, congressional reform would be necessary.  Congress would have to stop 
delegating their law-making authority to the federal agencies via vague statutes handed to 
agencies for further development and be directly responsible for all rulemakings.    
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     Philip Hamburger has a sound argument that the federal bureaucracy is 
unconstitutional.56Unfortunately, this argument identifies the problem, it does not present 
any viable solutions.  In his view, the administrative state is unconstitutional in multiple 
areas.  First, there is no guidance in the U.S. Constitution on how the federal bureaucracy 
is to be authorized or organized.  The process by which it functions through authorization 
from Congress violate the Constitution by deferring congressional legislative 
responsibility.  Although his views may be accurate, they provide no solution. 
     Although process for constitutional amendments is outlined within the Constitution, 
this process clearly is not an easy task.  In over 200 years since the signing of the 
Constitution only twenty-seven amendments have been ratified.  An effort to embrace the 
federal bureaucracy as it stands and develop a framework that would be constitutionally 
sound to incorporate it into the Constitution would be an enormous undertaking. This 
would require Congress, federal administrators, and the executive branch to negotiate an 
administrative framework that is functional and constitutionally sound.  In the present 
administration and Congress of 2020, that seems to be more fiction than reality.  
     The option of dismantling the administrative state obviously presents with enumerable 
problems also. The biggest of these problems would be lack of motive to do this. Just how 
would that look and function? How would the federal government manage essential 
programs like social security, head start, or Medicare? As previously mentioned, some 
duties could be eventually handed over to state government to manage.  There is not 
responsible means to completely dissolve the federal agencies without disrupting most 
 




aspects of American life.  It may seem refreshing to think about erasing the problem and 
starting anew with a so called ‘clean slate.’  But with such a large system of federal 
agencies intertwined with each other and with the states, it is not a feasible plan.   
     The authors of Deconstructing the Administrative State:  The Fight for Liberty discuss 
what they see as two major hurdles to overcome before any reform can be implemented.57  
First problem is big business alliances with the federal government.  Second problem is 
Congressional reform.  Congress is the government body that created the administrative 
state.  Now, the bureaucracy is too large to adequately oversee.  
     Moreno argues that it will take a constitutional revival by the people to reform the 
bureaucracy.  It will not happen without congressional reform.  He argues that Congress 
will not reform itself without being forced.58 Legislation with reform in mind has been 
attempted by members of Congress. 
     There has been an attempt to provide some reform of the administrative state by 
making Congress responsible for regulations before they can be implemented.   The 
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (REINS Act) was originally 
introduced to 112th Congress in 2011-2013.  More recently Senator Rand Paul has 
reintroduced the REINS Act to the sitting 116th Congress, 2019-2021.  This legislation 
would require major federal agency resolutions to be approved by Congress before 
implementing them.59 This bill could thwart off two specific areas of concern about the 
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administrative state. First, it could help reduce the likelihood of political bias be federal 
bureaucrats.  Secondly, it would halt Congress from delegating their legislative ability to 
career agency bureaucrats.  Although this legislation has gained much support, it still lacks 
enough congressional support to be passed. Although this bill could potentially reduce 
agency administrators from imposing their political bias in the regulations they develop, 
Moreno is concerned that passing this bill would worsen the situation by legitimizing the 
administrative state.     
    Although these various visions of reform may or may not be appropriate or applicable, 
none of them address the concern of political bias and what ramifications it can have in 
the administrative state.  Waldo argues that it is the relationship between public 
administration and psychology that brings the most clarity.  When attention is focused on 
the intersection of human nature and public administration, rationalism was found to be 
sparse.  Man had a very small part of rationalism.  He is largely weak and inadequate. 
60Man is self-seeking and will work to provide for his desires.  These insights into human-
nature seem to merge with the concept of man that the Founders held that man was fallible 
and needed mechanisms to divert these behaviors in government.  
     So, if the federal bureaucracy is to be politically neutral, can partisan influence be 
removed?  No, likely political ideology cannot be completely removed from employees 
within the administrative state and the career bureaucrats.  That would be an unreasonable 
expectation.   Mankind cannot completely remove biases and become computers. What 
could happen is to develop a means of regulation that could reduce the amount of bias 
within the federal agencies.  Bias can only be minimized by first acknowledging that it 
 
60 Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State:  A Study of the Political Theory of American Public 
Administration, (New York:  The Ronald Press Company, 1948), 24-25. 
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exists.  Once that hurdle is undertaken, then administrators will be better equipped to make 
fair policy decisions.  Additionally, the implementation of the REINS Act or similar 
legislation would not only make Congress accountable for regulations being passed, but 
it would also provide another step-in oversight to attempt to dissuade personal political 
bias being woven into public policy that has been developed by federal bureaucrats.  
Conclusion 
    So, can the administrative state as it has evolved in the twenty-first century be held up 
to the standard of political neutrality that Professor Woodrow Wilson declared so 
important?  Wilson had observed and read about the operational public administration in 
Germany. But the United States had not embarked upon a similar style of governing 
because it was not part of the constitutional structure. His theory had not been 
implemented or proven in a representative government as outlined in the Constitution of 
the United States.  Many scholars have argued that the administrative state itself is 
unconstitutional.  The American people have accepted the federal bureaucracy in their 
daily lives as a necessity.  The focus of this paper has been to assess if the present-day 
administrative state has been able to maintain political neutrality.  Many scholars have 
voiced concerns that the administrative state as it functions in modern society is virtually 
impossible to maintain any degree of political neutrality.  
    Literature shows that a larger percentage of federal employees identify as liberal than 
conservative.   Ninety-five percent of political donations from federal employees went to 
democratic liberal candidates.  It is difficult to imagine that these federal employees can 
lift off their cloaks of liberal ideology and become neutral for employment purposes.  
Instead, it is more likely that they would follow their underlying beliefs as a fundamental 
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truth as they enforce or design regulations for the Americans they serve.  This is one major 
area of concern about non-neutrality of career bureaucrats.   
   The other area of political influence of the administrative state of the twenty-first century 
is from executive power.   The executive office exerts power over federal agencies by 
bypassing Congress and signing executive orders.  What is lacking is understanding what 
percentage of executive orders directly influence the policy of federal agencies and impact 
Americans daily lives.  Although President Obama signed 276 executive orders in his 
tenure it is not clear what the political impact of those orders were relative to the 169 that 
President Trump has signed.  The concrete number does not correlate to the political 
impact on policy they made. But it appears to be one method of achieving executive goals 
without the backing of Congress.  
       It is not clear that political neutrality was ever possible within the administrative state.  
But the federal bureaucracy of the twenty-first century has virtually no chance of being 
nonpartisan and politically neutral due to the lack of impartiality from within the federal 
agencies and the external pressures applied by the executive branch.  How does this lack 
of political neutrality influence policymaking?  This paper has provided data where 
political bias has been seen in various federal agencies.  What impact does political bias 
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    The question of “Who would have power and influence over the representative 
democracy in the United States?” was a concern even prior to the signing of the 
Constitution. Early in the history of the United States, there were a very limited number 
of bureaucrats. The federal government and those in its employ were few.  Looking to 
modern times the number of federal agencies and civil servants that are employed by the 
agencies have grown exponentially.  Embedded in the U.S. Constitution is the design of a 
representative democracy that is comprised of three independent branches of government.  
The Constitution carefully outlines the responsibilities of each of the three branches.  
Article 1, section 1 of the Constitution states, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”   Since that time, the United States population has grown as well as the 
federal bureaucracy, sometimes known as the Administrative State.  Although the 
Constitution has been amended twenty-seven times, the fundamental outline of the 
representative democracy has not changed.  What has changed is how the federal 
government functions.  Although only Congress was given the power of legislation, it is 
not uncommon for them to authorize federal agencies to develop new regulations.  The 
regulations that federal agencies produce can carry the same weight and consequence as 
legislation that have been passed by Congress.   The policies developed by the non-elected 
officials within the administrative state do have social and financial impact . 
  This paper will provide a historical look at how the simple representative democracy of 
the United States has evolved into the administrative centered government of modern 
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times.  As the federal bureaucratic system has expanded, so have the methods that that 
special interests have found to influence policy decisions.  This paper will discuss some 
of the factors that influence policymaking process.  Each federal agency has specific 
responsibilities and areas of oversight that this paper will review, including the number of 
regulations they produce. In addition, evaluation of the outcomes of some of these 
regulations and the financial impact they have on society will be explored. 
       Heclo described the decentralized design of the American administrative state as “an 
unmanaged affair.”61 Initially, the United States was considered a mass democracy.  That 
descriptor faded as a significant bureaucratic state evolved.   The U.S. bureaucracies were 
described as, “naturally weak” by Alexis de Tocqueville.62  When American bureaucratic 
developments were compared to those of Germany and France, the U.S. was found to be 
much less influential and lacking.  During the Jefferson administration from 1801-1809, 
there were 153 federal employees.63 This scant number did not last long.  Thirty years 
later, the number of federal employees had increased by 150 percent from Jefferson’s 153 
to 230.  
        By 1830, most bureaucrats were chosen from which political party was in power.  
Federal officials were rotated out of their positions according to whomever had won the 
election.  This was known as the spoils system.  This system grew as the loyal party 
workers demanded federal government positions for their dedication to the party.  Prior 
to the spoils system a British model of appointing bureaucrats had be utilized.  This 
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method meant that local notables would be placed into administrative positions by those 
elected.  In neither of these systems were the bureaucrats seated because they were elected 
by the people they were to govern.   
     With the end of the Jacksonian spoils system there was an initiation of a nonpartisan 
merit-based system at the federal level.  The Pendleton Act was signed in 1883.  This act 
created a bipartisan Civil Service Commission.  The commission’s role was to evaluate 
federal employee candidates on a nonpartisan merit basis to ensure the patronage system 
had ended.  Candidates for Federal Government jobs would take a competitive exam as 
part of the selection process instead of by any ties they had to politicians. 
     During the progressive era, thousands of civil servant positions were created within the 
Civil Service System.  The Pendleton Act was important in two specific areas.  First, it 
provided civil servants protection from the political process.  Federal employees would 
no longer have to worry from one election to another if their position would be in jeopardy 
due to the newly elected leadership.  It ultimately provided civil servant’s protection from 
the political process.  Secondly, the Pendleton Act provided career opportunities for 
bureaucrats desiring to utilize their specialized education or experience in areas such as 
environment, energy, or other areas that would benefit federal agencies.   
     Stephen Skowronek in Building a New American State points out that the growth of 
the administrative state was more than just the need for oversight of social policies.64  He 
views it as a political battle of who was going to control America’s institutions.  As with 
most change in a vast country as the United States, it was accomplished incrementally.  
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As political reformers were trying to deconstruct the old spoils system, they met with 
staunch resistance from supporters of that system.  The process of change was to prove to 
be very arduous and slow.  In Woodrow Wilson’s opinion congressional dominance of 
the political system in America had stymied public administration.65 Public administration 
at that time had been micromanaged by Congress.  Congressional management of 
executive agencies had left the bureaucratic state in constant chaos.   
    Although the growth of the administrative state had been an ongoing process, there are 
a few periods in American history where rapid growth can be seen.  During Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s (FDR) presidency, the growth of the federal bureaucracy was tremendous.  In 
unemployment and the 1930’s and 1940’s administrative expansion was one method of 
combatting the poverty created by the Great Depression.  Many new federal government 
positions were created.  The new positions coupled with the birth federal programs such 
as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA) 
created by President F.D. Roosevelt in the 1930’s created thousands of federal positions.  
The growth of the federal bureaucracy continued as the United States entered World War 
II in 1939.  
       A second period of rapid growth of the federal bureaucracy was during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s.   During this time, concerns about social, environmental, and consumer safety 
arose.  Citizens demanded that the government address these new concerns.  It was during 
this period that H.R. 6675 titled Health Insurance for the Aged and Medical Assistance 
was signed in July 1965 by President Johnson.  This legislation became known as 
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Medicare.  New regulations were developed to address environmental protection and 
consumer safety issues.  These new regulations coupled with the initiation of the Medicare 
program required more expansion of the administrative state.  As the American public 
requested more government interventions to protect civil right and ensure public safety, 
the administrative state grew. 
    Skowronek’s argued the expansion of the administrative state is essentially a battle for 
control and is viewed as a direct threat against the status quo of the existing structure.66  
Forged in political power plays, Skowronek argues that the administrative state lacks 
coherent vision and purpose, often creating confusion over constitutional boundaries. This 
was no different during the initiation of Medicare and other social policies that were 
developed during the 1960’s.   A battle for control of the bureaucratic agencies meant that 
they could be politically influenced.  Why else would political parties be so adamant to 
gain control?  Goodnow in his work years before had said it was essential that government 
agents be free from political influence.67 Would it be possible to demand that government 
agents remain free from political influence.  But enforcing this demand would prove to be 
a very difficult task.  How can you guarantee that federal bureaucrats remain free from 
political influence and politically neutral as Goodnow suggested?  Is it possible to separate 
a federal employee from his core ideology? 
     The Founding Fathers had concerns about any one faction becoming too powerful in 
the government. In the design of government as outlined by the Founding Fathers, they 
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embedded four methods to attempt to prevent faction dominance. First, the separation of 
the three branches of the of the federal government, as outlined in the Constitution. Second 
is the federalism as a design of government.  With federalism, the power of the 
government would be shared by the federal government and the states.  Third is the 
principle of citizen representation. And lastly, the checks and balance that each branch 
holds by the other branches helps to lessen the likelihood of faction dominance.     
     The 16th Amendment was ratified in 1913.  This amendment established the right to 
impose an income tax by Congress.   The Office of Price Administration, founded in 1941, 
was a federal agency task with the responsibility of making sure that manufactured prices 
were kept low.  The War Board was then established in 1942 was to ensure the government 
had purchase priority of industrial products needed for wartimes.  It would be difficult to 
argue against the need for either of these federal entities.    
      The bureaucracy continued to expand throughout the twentieth century.  All the while, 
many Americans professed anti-bureaucracy attitudes.  Despite this attitude, citizens in 
the twentieth century have demanded government intervention in more and more areas of 
society.  Areas such as transportation and many social programs needed improved.  New 
programs were developed to meet these needs.  Federal agencies in turn were created to 
implement the new programs.   The Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Consumer Product 
Safety Act of 1972 were two such pieces of legislation.  The Clean Air Act designed to 
ensure citizens of safe air quality.  The Consumer Product Safety Act protected for the 
consumer from faulty products.  Each of these pieces of legislation would require 
expansion of the federal bureaucracy to implement and enforce the legislation.   
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     Within the federal administrative system, bureaucrats themselves were also an impetus 
for expansion.  Career federal administrators can request agency positions be created to 
better serve the agency mission.  Other administrators might expand their agency budget 
or role for job security.  When Congress votes on new legislation, many times it requires 
administrative experts to define the new regulations.  This process in turn may require 
additional federal bureaucrats to design, implement, oversee, and enforce the new 
regulations. 
                    Entanglement of the Administrative State and Policy Making 
     While campaigning during the election of 1912, a debate was initiated between 
candidate Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt about how to address concerns about 
large corporate trusts that had evolved and were exerting influence in the financial 
markets.  Both candidates had different opinions on how to approach this concern.  
Roosevelt believed that a national commission should be developed by the federal 
government that could regulate the trusts.  The commission he envisioned would be under 
the control of the executive branch.  It would employ experts in the banking field that 
would be best at understanding how the trusts worked.  Because the corporate trusts had 
become so influential in the financial market, Roosevelt believed that the commission 
would be best to provide regulations to diminish the control that the trusts had developed.   
    Wilson on the other hand was concerned that such a commission could potentially be 
filled with experts that had previously been part of the trusts themselves.  If this were true, 
this maneuver could potentially allow the trusts to self-regulate. In a broader view of the 
situation, it would allow the corporate trusts to control the government through the 
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commission.  Wilson was concerned about giving experts in the employ of the 
commission ‘unguided discretion” it could create corporate monopolies.68   
       A reality of the federal bureaucracy growth is that it has become exceeding difficult 
for Congress to pass very specific legislation for a variety of reasons.  First, is that 
Congress lacks specialized knowledge that may be needed to fully understand what 
precise legislation needed to address a concern in a topic such as air quality.  Secondly, 
Congressional seats are elected positions.  Ambitions for re-election can lead politicians 
to seek legislation that is acceptable in the eyes of their constituents.  Voting for 
ambiguous legislation allows members of congress to appear to support their constituents’ 
views.  Compromise in Congress rarely produces focused legislation.  Instead, passing 
vague legislation and authorizing federal bureaucrats to develop the rule has become the 
norm.   
     A concern with this process is that federal bureaucrats writing regulations could be 
influenced.  This could lead to an undesirable influence on public policy.  This argument 
has continued throughout much of the history of the United States.  Some citizens and 
politicians have been concerned that the power to produce regulations have been turned 
over to non-elected officials with no direct accountability by the people.69 Once the impact 
of the administrative state was realized, reforms were implemented.   
     Cook introduces the term neutral expertise with regards to bureaucrats with rulemaking 
authority in public policy making process. If administrators could claim   political 
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neutrality, then any concern with personal bias in the rulemaking process would be a moot 
point.  But special interest influence on bureaucrats could come from politicians also.  So, 
even neutral experts in the employ of federal agencies could be influenced by special 
interests.  Cornelius Kerwin provides a list of influencing factors on policy making.70 His 
list includes (1) Congress, (2) the President, (3) the court system, (4) other federal 
agencies, (5) special interest groups, (6) and the press.  In the next section, I will provide 
a closer look at special interest groups and how they can influence the policy making 
process.  
Interest Groups Role in Policy Making 
     The role federal agencies play in the modern administrative governance of the United 
States is vital.  The services and benefits that these agencies provide to the average citizen 
are enumerable.  The services range from physical protection, unemployment benefits, 
environmental protection, to financial market stability. What may not be so clearly 
understood is how federal agencies are authorized to interpret legislation that Congress, 
or the President mandates have given the agency.  In a recent press conference, President 
Biden was quoted as giving the Department of Justice the task of 1) within 30 days “will 
issue proposed rule to stop the proliferation of ‘ghost guns” 2) within 60 days will issue 
proposed rule to clarify about a device that turns a pistol into a short-barreled rifle, and 3) 
within 30 days will publish model “red-flag’ legislation for states.71 To produce legislation 
like this, it  is the responsibility of Congressional  as stated in the Constitution.  
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     Federal agencies typically employ well educated specialist in their field who are 
thought to be better qualified to design more narrow regulations than politicians.  How in 
this process can special interest groups influence federal administrative policy making?  
An interest group is any organized group that has organized to promote a specific ideal or 
point of view. They have a common goal of achieving their desired outcome by 
influencing the policy making process.  The influence may be inserted in the agenda 
setting period, the data gathering process, the drafting process, or the implementation 
process.   
     The special interest groups may be large influential corporations, unions, or religious 
organizations to name a few. There are organizations that are termed “Astroturf” groups.  
These groups are quasi-grass roots organizations that are created and utilized by large 
business interests as instruments of influence. The impact of special interest groups has 
grown since their inception. Now there is virtually an organization for almost every cause 
in society.  Presently, there are over 170 public interest groups registered with the federal 
government.72 These interest groups have avenues to approach the President, Congress, 
and the federal agencies themselves.  Special interest groups may not be new, but what is 
new is the vast number of these organizations and the methods by which they can advocate 
for a specific cause or philosophy.   
     The special interest groups for either pro-life or pro-abortion alone have over thirteen 
million dollars contributed in 2019 by the top organizations that focus on promoting 
 
72 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/gov_relations/oirpublicinterestgroups. Accessed 4/10/2021.  
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policies that are supportive to their respective goals.73 Figure 1 shows the amount of 
money that is spent to develop or shape policies that will favor individual ideals in four 
special interest areas.  There is over 3 trillion dollars donated to various groups or 
politicians to influence policies related to the four areas in the graph. Communications 
would include telecommunications and social media companies such as Facebook and 
Twitter.  Ideology designation includes issues such as environment, healthcare, gun 
control, and abortion.  Finance includes issues involving insurance companies, real estate, 
investment firms, and commercial banks.  Energy includes natural resources such as oil 
and gas companies, electric utilities, and mining industry.  
Figure 1  
 
Data Source: Center for Responsive Politics. https://opensecrets.org/industries/. Accessed May 5, 2021 
     A close look at two of the most heated political topics alone, gun rights and abortion, 
contribute millions of dollars from special interest groups either supporting or opposing 
these topics.  The money is spent in various methods that attempt to influence policies 
on these topics. Figure 2 breaks down the contributions from the top four special interest 
groups either supporting or opposing these two topics.  
 
Figure 2  
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Data Source: Center for Responsive Politics. https://opensecrets.org/industries/. Accessed May 5, 2021 
 
      The financial resources of special interest groups coupled with social media outlets 
have been able to provide an international voice for specific causes.   The structure of 
special interest groups has evolved.  Many are very structured with legal teams and endless 
resources to promote their cause.  Others are poorly structured and disorganized.  Social 
media has had a tremendous influence on the amount of people that can be reached as well 
as improved funding for these groups.   
                  
 
                                   Administrative Agencies Issuing Regulations 
   After a short review of history of the federal bureaucracy and its expansion, it is time to 
look at how it regulations and influences policy.  As of November 2018, there were 445 
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federal agencies and commissions within the fifteen department. Each agency has a 
different mission and set of responsibilities.  One responsibility for an agency 
administrator in the modern administrative government is to “fill in the blanks” left by 
congressional legislation. Over time, it has become easier and involves less political 
liability to let federal agencies to fill in more of the blanks for Congress.74 It takes less 
effort to have a federal agency draft a regulation than it does to draft and pass a law 
through the legislative pathway as outlined in the Constitution.  A small percentage of 
bills brought to Congress survive the process to become law.   
     The significance of this can be seen when comparing the number of laws passed by 
Congress versus the number of regulations promulgated by the administrative state. In 
2006, Congress passed 321 new laws through the legislative pathway.  In that same year, 
the federal agencies in the administrative state promulgated 3718.  That is one legislative 
law for every eleven new regulations from federal agencies.  In 2016, Congress passed 
214 new laws through the legislative pathway.  Federal agencies announced 3853 new 
regulations in the same year.75 These figures show that for every one new law that is 
drafted and survives the rigors of the congressional legislative pathway, that eighteen new 
regulations are put into effect by federal agency bureaucrats. The regulations that are 
promulgated by federal bureaucrats are done without any representation from the citizens.  
 
74 William Kovacs, “The Riddle of How Agencies Can Make So Many Laws Easier Than Congress,” U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, December 19, 2017, https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/the-
riddle-how-agencies-can-make-so-many-laws-easier-congress.  (accessed May 3, 2021). 
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      What are the concerns about this modern administrative state governance? First, the 
U.S. Constitution outlines a Federal Democratic republic.  By design the Legislative 
branch solely was given the privilege of developing laws to govern society.  Federal 
agencies are under the control of the executive branch to ensure the law of the land is 
implemented.  The career bureaucrats within the federal agencies that draft regulations 
and “fill in the blanks” for Congress have not been elected by the people.  This leaves 
federal bureaucrats not directly accountable to the citizens for which they are regulating.    
 
Public Policy Officials Views  
     Just who are these bureaucrats that draft policy? Do their beliefs and values resemble 
U.S. citizens for which they are developing regulations? Do they have a strong 
understanding of the people they are make rules for? A survey was conducted of 
government officials that are part of the policy-making process.76 Respondents to the 
survey were White House staff, Civil Service employees, and policy making community 
such as economist and public policy analyst.  These respondents were chosen due to the 
enormous roles they play in governance in the modern administrative state.  
     This survey focused on the attitude and knowledge of bureaucrats about the general 
population. If the bureaucrats are given the ability to govern the American people, how 
do they compare to those they govern? First, the data showed that the respondents 
surveyed where much more educated than the average American.  The public officials 
 
76 Jennifer Bachner and Benjamin Ginsberg, What Washington Gets Wrong: The Unelected Officials Who 
Actually Run the Government and Their Misconceptions about the American People (New York:  
Prometheus Books, 2016),14-50. 
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were four times more likely to have a bachelor’s degree and five times more likely to have 
a master’s degree than the general population.  
     The median income for the bureaucrats was more than the median income of U.S. 
citizens. Civil servants starting salary range is 25% more that than the median income of 
the general public.  Overall, public officials in the policy-making process differ 
demographically from the general public.   
     A third variable shown in the data is that bureaucratic respondents are much more 
understanding of the political world and their role in it compared to the general public.  
When political ideology was surveyed the data showed that the public official respondents 
had a much stronger commitment to their ideology than the general public.  The 
percentages of ideologies labeled as liberal, moderate, or conservative where not 
statistically like the percentages of the same in the general public.  Political party 
identification had similar data.  The percentage of survey respondents that identified as 
Democrat were 5-11 precent higher than the percentage of registered Democrats in the 
general public. Twenty-nine percent of the survey respondents identified their political 
party affiliation as Republican while 39 percent of the American people identify as 
Republican.  This leave a 10 percent discrepancy between civil servants and the general 
public they are to represent.   
     The same survey conducted by Bachner, and Ginsberg surveyed the public officials 
about their understanding of the age, race, and income of those they govern.  To develop 
regulations for those to be governed a clear understanding of whom the governed are 
necessary.  The data showed that 52 percent inaccurately responded to the number of 
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African Americans in the general public77. Almost 79 percent of the respondents 
underestimated the number of white Americans. Eighty percent of the respondents 
inaccurately estimated the number of citizens that are sixty-five years or older. Sixty-four 
percent of the respondents underestimated the median income of the general public.  
     When these same public official respondents were asked their opinions of how 
knowledgeable they believed the American’s people were in specific policy areas.  The 
results paint a dim picture of public officials view of the American people that they are 
regulating. The data presented in figure 3 shows public officials’ opinions of Americans 
related to policy areas in modern society.   
FIGURE 3. 
Americans Knowledge of Policy Area as Perceived by Government 
Officials  
(Valued as Percentage of Respondents)  
  A Great 
Deal  
Quite a bit  Some  Very Little  None   
Social Security  5.6  17.1  37.4  38.5  1.5   
Public Schools  4.4  19.1  39.9  36.4  0.9   
Welfare  2.6  7.0  32.3  55.1  2.9   
Environment  1.2  5.0  30.5  58.9  4.4   
Data Source:  Jennifer Bachner and Benjamin Ginsberg, What Washington Gets Wrong: The Unelected 




These figures clearly show that public officials do not think much of their perception of 
what Americans know of important social issues.  In four very important social issues in 
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America, the public officials felt that greater than seventy-five percent of the general 
public had some, very little, or no knowledge of these issues.  
     An overview of this information shows that the public servants that were surveyed did 
not have an accurate picture demographically of the of the general public. Also, they were 
dissimilar in terms of education and income to the Americans for which they are 
regulating.   And they certainly do not think highly about the perceived knowledge base 
of Americans towards important social issues.   The statistics presented reveal that the 
respondent’s ideology and the strength of those convictions are much different than the 
general population.  So, can bureaucrats with dissimilar beliefs and poor understanding of 
the general population produce regulations that would represent the will of the of citizens? 
   
Cost Analysis of Federal Agency Regulations 
     The financial impact of new regulations is part of the policy drafting process.  One task 
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to provide a report of cost analysis of 
regulations enacted in the past ten years.  The cost and benefit of new regulations can be 
a very difficult task.  The OMB annual report is very comprehensive.  The OMB has 
acknowledged that the review process has limitations.  Given the high number of 
regulations that are enacted annually, the OMB only tracks regulations that are ear-marked 
as major.  A major regulation means that the financial impact of it is expected to be over 
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$100 million in a year.78  This screening methodology leaves potentially thousands of 
regulations not analyzed.    
     Another limitation of the OMB method of evaluating the financial impact of federal 
regulations is that it does not include regulations drafted by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).  Also, the OMB 
annual report includes only those regulations that include estimated cost/benefit analysis 
as part of the agency policy drafting process.  In 2013, there were more than 3200 new 
regulations published. Over five hundred of those regulations enacted by federal agencies 
that were designated as major.  When following the guidelines utilized by the OMB in the 
annual report only 115 of the over 500 new federal regulations were included.  That is less 
than 25% of the of the major regulations were in the annual report.  Overall, that is 0.035 
percent of the total regulations that were passed were in the OMB annual report.   
     A third limitation of the OMB’s method of evaluating the cost of new regulations is 
that is based on the expected values, not actual figures.  Expected values can be 
inaccurate.79 Prices of products and services can fluctuate month to month.  A look at 
regulations enacted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) meant to reduce fine 
particle matter (PM2.5) show the difficulty with calculation cost and benefit of them.  The 
EPA during the drafting of the regulation predicted the reduction of PM2.5 would reduce 
premature deaths.  The problem with this prediction is that there is no actual known 
 
78 Susan Dudley, “OMB’s Reported Benefits of Regulations:  Too Good to Be True?”, Regulatory Reform, 
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causation between PM2.5 and premature deaths. Also, the OMB recognizes that there is no 
clearly accepted monetary value applicable for reducing mortality.  The cost and benefit 
of the regulation that was enacted to protect citizens from premature death was based on 
estimates of factors that were not known to correlate directly with premature death.  The 
estimated figure from that computation was then multiplied by the value that they assigned 
to reducing mortality. The final analysis that is based upon two arbitrary figures is then 
reported to Congress.  Risk analysis experts question whether the EPA claims of benefit 
are real or significant.80 Cox concluded with over 95 percent probability that there is no 
link between reducing PM2.5 and premature death.   
     In 2012 the EPA enacted a regulation that was developed to limit the amount of 
mercury emitted from coal fired power plants.  More than twenty years after the 1990 
Clean Air Act, the EPA published regulations for the reduction of mercury and air toxins 
(MATS).  The underlying beneficial implications as presented by the EPA were that the 
reduction of MATS would lead to overall health benefits for Americans and increase the 
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) points in children.  It would do this by preventing neurological 
damage that was due to MATS exposure.81 The EPA produced a regulatory impact 
assessment and fact sheet related to this proposed regulation.  The cost of complying with 
this new policy would be an outstanding $10 billion.  According to the impact assessment 
from the EPA, the benefits gained by the regulation would a savings of $90 billion, prevent 
11,000 premature deaths annually, and improve the IQ of children exposed to MATS.   
 
80 Louis Anthony Cox, “Reassessing the Human Benefits from Cleaner Air,” Risk Analysis 32, no. 5 (2012):  
816-829,  
doi:  10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011. 01698.x   (accessed Feb. 14, 2021). 
81 United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Mercury and Air Toxin Standards:  Clean Power 
Plants,” https://www.epa.gov/mats/cleaner-power-plants.  (accessed April 15, 2021). 
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The EPA regulatory impact assessment showed that the average increase in IQ from 
implementing this regulation would be 0.00209 points for children exposed.82 The EPA 
report also states that the primary source of exposure to mercury for people is known to 
come from eating fish that are exposed to mercury from the air that reaches the water 
source, not through MATS emitted from coal burning power plants.   
     George Washington Regulatory Studies Center (GWRSC) has conducted a wide 
variety of research and data collection that is related to federal agency policy making.   
One analysis conducted by GWRSC compared significant economic regulations that been 
issued by federal agencies under specific presidents.  The data the center comparison was 
from the Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama administrations.83 Analysis of this data shows 
that the number of regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) increased from 21 percent during President Clinton’s terms to 42 percent during 
President Bush’s terms.  Under President Obama, the number of regulations decreased 
slightly to 40 percent.  The number of economically significant regulations issued by 
federal agencies under President Clinton’s terms were 161.  This number increased by 62 
percent while President Obama was in office.  The highest increase in federal regulation 
produced at this time was from the Department of Health and Human Services.  This 
increase is the effect of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  The 
percentage of federal agency regulations drafted by the HHS under President Clinton and 
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President Obama were 21 percent and 40 percent, respectively.  The data shows that the 
number of federal regulations enacted by the administrative state significantly increased 
over the span of these two presidencies.  The EPA produced 73 new economically 
significant policies under President Clinton alone.84 That correlates with 24 percent of all 
economically significant policies enacted during his presidency.  EPA and HHS have held 
consistently at writing 45-55 percent of the overall economically significant rules over all 
three presidencies.   
     Another way to assess the impact of policies enacted by the administrative state is to 
look at the cost of developing and enforcing the regulations.  In data gathered from the 
Budget of the United States Government, President Clintons administration budgetary cost 
of federal regulation expanded from close to $24 billion to over $31 billion during his 
presidency.85 President Obama’s. budgetary costs for federal regulation were initially 
calculated to be $41 billion and climbed to $49 billion during his presidency.  A closer 
look at the date also shows a tremendous increase in budgetary expenditures required for 
agency staff and cost devoted to regulatory activity.  This cost was calculated at $24 billion 
at the start of President Clintons presidency and climbed to $49 billion at the close of 
President Obama’s last term.  The biggest rise in cost of regulatory expenditures were 
seen in policies of social impact.86 The percentage of budgetary monies spent on social 
 
84 Brian Ryoo, “OMB Releases Draft of Annual Regulation’s Impacts,” The Regulatory Review, June 5, 
2013.  
85 Weidenbaum Center, “Budgetary Costs of Federal Regulations, Adjusted for Inflation,” George 
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center.  
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Washington University Regulatory Studies Center. 
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policies is consistently 77-78 percent through all three presidents.  Economic policy 
development and enforcement cost is 17-18 percent of the budgetary cost.   
 
Conclusion  
     The data shows that the federal administrative bureaucracy produces far more 
regulations than the legislative branch does.  Federal agencies can produce up to elven 
times more regulations than Congress produces through the legislative pathway.  The 
regulations that are enacted by the federal bureaucracy carry the same weight as legislative 
statutes.  The Judicial branch of the federal government has provided legitimacy of the 
administrative state through Supreme Court decisions such as Chevron U.S.A. Inc v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc (1984).87 Seventy-seven percent of the 
regulations enacted by the federal administrative agencies are focused on social issues.  
Eighteen percent impact economic policy.  The cost of agency staff and oversight of  
regulations perpetuated by the federal bureaucracy has been as high as $49 billion 
annually.  The impact including the cost of initiation and ongoing oversight can be 
staggering.   Another concern about regulations drafted by the federal bureaucracy is the 
methodology used by the Office of Management and Budget to calculate the cost and 
benefit analysis of new regulations.  The examples provided reveal a few shortcomings in 
the analysis methods in use.  The examples also show that new regulations were enacted 
despite inaccuracies and misinformation in the federal agencies preliminary planning 
 
87 Legal Information Institute.  Cornell Law School.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense 
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phase.  Although the federal administrative regulations do have such a tremendous impact 
on social and economic policy it is difficult to trust the accuracy of the data utilized in the 
drafting process.   
     Special interest groups have multiple avenues through which they can influence new 
policy formation.  Many of these groups spend millions of dollars in attempts to 
manipulate public policy.  Special interest groups can convince politicians to exert power 
over federal administrative agencies to influence regulations.  Another way to influence 
federal agencies that draft regulations is the data used by administrative bureaucrats to 
draft public policy may be provided by private companies with special interests.  These 
are a few methods that special interest groups can influence public policy through the 
administrative state’s regulatory process. One potential method that public policy may be 
influenced by the administrative state is through bureaucratic personal beliefs and bias.   
    If the saying, “history repeats itself” is accurate, it would be wise to reflect upon the 
struggles that led to the development of the administrative state, the shortcomings of the 
modern administrative state, and the present political atmosphere.  Skowonek in his 
writings reviews the problems encountered early in the development of the administrative 
state including the struggle for power between the judicial branch and the political 
parties.88 Society became much more complex after the industrialization of the United 
States and required a more structured administrative capacity.  Skowonek’s study 
uncovers three conditions in society that were necessary as a catalyst for change: crisis, 
class conflict, and societal complexity.  At the end of the nineteenth century there was a 
 
88 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State:  The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities 1877-1920.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge Press, 1982). 
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crisis that led to the belief that a stronger administrative machine was needed.  There was 
class conflict between the labor force and the wealthy capitalists.  Lastly, America was 
changing to a more industrialized urban society.  These three conditions surmounted and 
led to a slow but ultimately dramatic change in the federal administrative state to meet the 
needs of changing times.  The political parties resisted change because they feared that 
change mean loss power.   
     In the modern administrative state, we can still see similar struggles.  Crisis can be seen 
in the battle within political system between the conservatives, progressives, and the 
anarchists.  Class conflict can be seen by politically motivated groups to divide the 
working class noted as the 99 percent against those labeled elites known as the One 
Percent.  We can also see the class divide within the administrative state itself.  The 
individuals in the administrative state that generate new regulations have a dim view of 
the intelligence of the American people.  We saw that the bureaucrats do not have a clear 
picture of who the average American is.  Societal complexity can be seen in multiple 
places.  Modern American society is electronic technology driven.  The information 
highway of the internet has created an electronic international network of awareness.  
Social media has created a world where there are no borders.   The U.S. political system 
continues to fight the hegemony of party needs.   
     In the process of the demands placed upon the government, the courts, and the parties, 
the administrative state continues to grow.  The old system of the 19th and into the 20th 
century has been molded into a professional federal bureaucracy.  But what appeared as 
the solution, has become the problem.  The federal administrative bureaucracy has little 
Congressional oversight, does not understand whom they represent all the while enacting 
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federal regulations that have the power and enforceability of legislative laws. It is on the 
edge of chaos that change takes place.  Should reform take the form of more Congressional 
control over the administrative state or by dismantling it?  Should a Constitutional 
amendment be proposed that accepts the administrative state as the fourth branch of 
government? A final question to reflect upon is, has the U.S. federal bureaucracy been 
able to adhere to constitutional principles? This question will be addressed in the next 





How Do Federal Agencies, Government Privatization, and Constitutional   
Principles Mix? 
 
Since the 1960’s the administrative state has expanded at a significant rate.  In 1960 the 
administration of President Kennedy employed 1.6 million federal employees.89 By 2019 
that number has grown to 9 million federal employees.90  From 1960-2019 there are seven 
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new Cabinet agencies.  The U.S. population in 1960 was 180.7 million people.91  The U.S. 
census numbers show that the population had grown to 328.2 million by 2019. Not only 
had the population grown, but services that were expected to be provided by the 
government had expanded. The administrative state now employs approximately 6% of 
the U.S. workforce.92  The federal bureaucracy is responsible for national infrastructure, 
conservation of natural resources, promote educational excellence, and national security 
to name a few services. The administrative state encompasses 137 independent agencies 
with over 200 other federal agencies and commissions.93 The services provided by these 
federal agencies can be very specialized.  Discussions focused on outsourcing were 
initiated in the late 1980’s. By the early 1990, the U.S. Federal government had embraced 
outsourcing federal services to private companies to improve efficiency, provide the 
necessary specialization, and decrease overall budgetary costs.94 Federal dollars spent on 
outsourcing of temporary help services have increased from $300 million in 2008 to over 
$1.7 billion in 2018.95 The Veterans Administration (VA), the Indian Health Services 
(HIS), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Bureau of Prisons, and the Federal 
Occupational Health clinics signed contracts in 2018 that tallied up over $884 million 
alone.  This occurred when the Trump administration chose to privatize previously 
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government provided healthcare.  The federal agencies now spend hundreds of billions of 
dollars outsourcing items beyond services such as purchasing information technology and 
weapons systems from private sector companies.96 
      Although the number of federal civilian employees has only grown from 2.04 million 
in 2017 to 2.08 million in 2019, the number of federal outsourcing contracts has 
increased.97  Federal government contract spending has increased for the last five years in 
a row.  In 2020 government contract spending increased by $83 billion in one year alone.98 
It was expected that $682 billion would be spent in 2020 for federal outsourced 
contractors.  This data entails only companies that hold unclassified contracts and have a 
direct relationship with the government.  It does not include any subcontractors nor 
classified contracts.  As the number of outsourced federal contracts expand the oversight 
capabilities of the federal agencies do not expand.   How does outsourcing or privatizing 
of government responsibilities affect the checks and balance system of the U.S. 
democracy? 
    The federal agencies, also known as the administrative state, have been charged with 
the duty of conducting the business of the government.  Federal agencies as part of the 
business of government are given the responsibility to develop specialized regulations by 
Congress.  Federal agencies bring vague congressional statutes to life by writing federal 
regulations that embody the essence of what Congress intended in the statute handed to 
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the agency.  The federal agencies within the administration are also given charge of 
enforcing and oversight of the regulations they have written.  There have been scholars 
who argue that this method of regulation development is unconstitutional and illegal.99 
      This paper will not engage in the debate of the constitutionality of the federal 
bureaucracy.  Instead, it will look at the history of federal outsourcing, its expansion and 
how outsourcing and privatization of federal agency responsibilities are woven into daily 
life. The paper will look at how privatization of federal duties intersects with the standards 
of the U.S. democracy such of transparency, integrity, accountability.   
    The services and products that the modern federal bureaucracy is expected to deliver is 
almost limitless.  The federal governments responsibilities have expanded from securing 
fair interstate commerce regulations in the 1880’s to deciding if the Florida key deer is 
listed as an endangered species on Big Pine Key, Florida in 1967.100 101 With such a vast 
expansive list of regulations, how does the federal government oversee the accuracy of 
the regulations written by administrative bureaucrats?  Then, when the regulations are 
implemented, how is oversight of the new rules achieved?  These questions are answered 
by understanding there are processes that are utilized within the government structure.   
     Congress signed into law the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1947 that 
outlines how federal agencies develop regulations and ultimately publish them in the 
Federal Registry.  Congress can delegate it authority of rulemaking to federal agencies.  
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These regulations carry the force of the law.  In National Latino Media Coalition v. 
Federal Communications Commission (1987), “A valid legislative rule is binding upon 
all persons, and on the courts, to the same extent as a congressional statute. When 
Congress delegates rulemaking authority to an agency, and the agency adopts legislative 
rules, the agency stands in the place of Congress and makes law.”102 Although Congress 
can delegate rulemaking authority, it retains the power to repeal the regulation the agency 
has written.  Congress also retains the power for oversight of regulations.    It is through 
1) review of newly produced regulations by Congress and the public, then 2) oversight of 
federal agency implementation of regulations, that the democratic process can be 
maintained.   
     Once Congress has authorized an agency to promulgate a rule, the APA requires the 
agency to publish a notice of intent to promulgate a rule.  This notice is published in the 
Federal Register.  In this process, persons or organizations that have an interest in the rule 
being proposed can comment.  The comment section of the APA process is the method by 
which the general public can have a say in how they are governed.  The agency has a 
responsibility to review the public comments and address the concerns of citizens.  At the 
completion of this step in the process, the agency can publish the new rule with a statement 
of purpose in the Federal Register.103  Rules that are interpretive in nature or rules that are 
related to agency personnel only do not have to go through the rigors of public notice and 
comments.  Also, if a new rule does not need to go through the notice and comment 
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process if it is deemed impracticable or contrary to general public interest.  Newly 
promulgated agency rules must then be reviewed by the Office of Management and 
Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).  There are two conditions 
to this step of the review process. First, independent federal agencies do not have to submit 
new rules to OIRA.  Secondly, for all other federal agencies, only ‘significant’ rules must 
be submitted to OIRA for review.  OIRA then assesses the new rule for its consistency 
with the present administration’s overall goals.  At this point in the process the public and 
the executive branch have had the opportunity to review the newly promulgated rule. 
     Congressional oversight is necessary to ensure that the agency has acted as the 
legislation had intended.  If the rule is not what Congress had intended, it can be 
overturned by using the Congressional Review Act (CRA).104 The CRA was passed in 
1996 so that Congress to have better oversight of the regulation development.  It can also 
be utilized by members of Congress to draw attention to a rule and make public their 
disapproval of it. Since the passing of the CRA, Congress has utilized it as a method of 
overturning a federal agency regulation seventeen times.105 The first time this method of 
overturning a regulation was during 2001-2002 107th Congress.  The other sixteen times 
that Congress overturned newly drafted agency rules was during the 115th Congress during 
2017-2018 session.  During the 115th Congress, the Republican party controlled both 
houses and President Trump was in control of the executive branch.  
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     In April 2019, the acting director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sent 
out a memorandum to all executive agencies and departments.106 This memorandum now 
requires independent agencies to give notice of pending new rules to OIRA so they can 
decide if they are major rules and review cost-benefit analysis provided.  Before this 
memorandum, it was not required that independent agencies inform OIRA of new rules.  
There are concerns that this new process by which OIRA becomes the gatekeeper for 
pending regulations that given it more control that it did not previously have.107 The first 
hypothetical concerns are that OIRA might cause delays in the process of newly submitted 
regulations.  Second, there is concern that OIRA could potentially dispute figures that 
were submitted with const-benefit analysis of an agency.  Theoretically, these stumbling 
blocks might be methods for a president to exert control through the OMB and OIRA on 
all federal agencies.  
The Intersection of Outsourcing and Rulemaking 
     As reviewed in the previous section the rulemaking process through federal agencies 
with congressional authorization can be very cumbersome.  But every year thousands of 
new federal regulations are enacted by the administrative state. How can federal agencies 
keep up with the enforcement of the plethora of new regulations?  If Congress gives a 
federal agency authority to develop and enforce new regulations, does this mean that the 
authority can be transferred to private companies?  One reason that it has been accepted 
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that Congress can request agency help in writing rules is because they are supposed to 
possess specialization is specific areas that Congress may not have.108   What happens 
when a federal agency is unable to ensure oversight of its regulations?  This can happen 
as a result budget cuts or understaffing.   
Privatizing Public Rulemaking and Oversight to Private Organizations 
     The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) which is an agency within the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has developed a list of regulations and 
quality standards that U.S. healthcare facilities must meet to receive federal Medicare and 
Medicaid monies.  To ensure these standards are met, CMS is expected to inspect facilities 
on a regular basis. CMS does not have the resources to the tens of thousands of healthcare 
facilities.  The types of facilities that must be certified that they comply with CMS 
developed regulations include but not limited to hospitals, outpatient surgical centers, 
dialysis centers, nursing homes, and hospice settings. These health care organizations 
must be certified that they comply with Conditions of Participation (CoPs) or Conditions 
of Coverage (CfCs) which are minimum requirements for health and safety of the 
facilities.    
     CMS has outsourced the certification process to either a state agency that acts on behalf 
of the federal government or through private accrediting organizations that have been 
“deemed” to have the that meet or exceed those of CMS.  The CMS defines deeming 
authority as: “The authority granted by CMS to accrediting organizations to determine, 





compliance with corresponding Medicare regulations.109  M+CO is” any private or public 
entity licensed by a State as a risk-bearing entity that is certified by CMS.”110  Addendum 
1 provides a copy of the application requirements checklist that is requested by CMS for 
the Deeming process.   
     Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services now “deems” ten companies with the 
responsibility of assuring health care facilities meet Medicare standards.  The companies 
are the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care (AAAHC), the 
Accreditation Association for Hospitals and Health Systems (AAHHS), the Accreditation 
Commission for Healthcare, Inc (ACHC), the American Association for Accreditation of 
Ambulatory Surgery Facilities (AAAASF), the Center for Improvement in Healthcare 
Quality (CIHQ), the Community Health Accreditation Partner (CHAP), DNV GL-
Healthcare (DNVGL), the National Dialysis Accreditation Commission (NDAC), the 
Compliance Team (TCT), and the Joint Commission (TJC).  CMS has given each of these 
organizations the responsibility to oversee that the regulations enacted by them are being 
followed.  Table 1 shows each organization and how many facilities they are responsible 
for oversight of federal regulations in the healthcare arena.  Without certification by the 
appropriate private organization, health care facilities cannot receive federal Medicare 
monies.   
 
 






Source: www.cms.gov. Data as of July 3, 2021 
The Joint Commission (TJC) is the largest of these private organizations.  As noted 
in the above table, TJC certifies over 22,000 facilities as an organization ‘deemed’ by 
CMS.   This warrants a closer look at TJC and its practices.  The Joint Commission is a 
not-for-profit organization that is managed by a board of 21 members.  The members are 
physicians, administrators, nurses, quality experts, educators, and a consumer advocate.111  
None of the members are specifically required to be employed by CMS or the federal 
bureaucracy.  There is also an international branch of the Joint Commission that accredits 
facilities internationally.  The Joint Commission states that they, “interface with the 
federal government and other stakeholders on key legislative, regulatory, and public 
policy issues.”112 TJC says that the standards are always evolving with input from the 
Board of Commissioner.   The organizations have been ‘deemed’ qualified to provide 
 




oversight of the CMS regulations meet or exceed CMS standards.  So, TJC as a private 
organization can have standards that exceed CMS standards and impose these on health 
care facilities.  If a health care facility does not comply with the regulations enacted by 
CMS and any additional regulations that any of the ten accreditation organizations my 
also enforce, federal Medicare reimbursement money will be withheld.  CMS has 
outsourced its congressionally delegated responsibility of enforcing federal regulations to 
private organizations that can cripple a health care facility by withholding accreditation.   
     Another area of concern with CMS delegating its governmental responsibility to 
accreditation organizations is oversight.  CMS allows organizations such as TJC to 
oversee federal regulations are being followed.  But how is CMS overseeing that 
accrediting organizations are properly doing their job?  The oversight mechanism for this 
specific outsourcing is that CMS reserves the right to randomly audit an accredited 
facility.  The ten accrediting organizations certify approximately 43,000 facilities 
nationwide.  That would require a tremendous number of random audits for a federal 
agency that does not have the resources to do the accreditation process in house.  
Privatizing National Security 
     Many would agree that outsourcing of supplies and custodial services do not produce 
any consequence to democracy in the United States.  Outsourcing contracts many times is 
a very valuable tool for the federal government. Outsourcing has allowed the federal 
government to gain specialization in some areas that would otherwise be too expensive to 
obtain.  Without outsourcing short term contracts can be arranged and hiring federal 
employees can be time consuming.  These are just a few of the benefits of outsourcing.  
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    Does that same mindset hold true when services that are typically viewed as 
governmental in nature?  The management of outsourcing contracts and the services 
provided by private companies once the agreement has been signed is a different story. 
Agency bureaucrats have processes and procedures in place to manage federal employees.  
Private companies that have contracts for an outsourced service manage their own 
employees.  The agency bureaucrats have very limited exercise over private company 
employees.113 Federal contracts for outsourcing of services can be seen in the federal 
prison system, private contractors to help fight wars, and companies to help rebuild war 
torn countries.  Outsourcing of services have expanded to disaster relief, national security, 
and the intelligence community. These government services are much different than a 
company securing a federal contract to provide printer paper to the White House.   
     Concerns of national security can arise with outsourced contracts to companies that 
provide services for the U.S. intelligence community.  Booz Allen Hamilton held the 
federal contract with the National Security Agency (NSA).  The NSA mission focuses on 
the cybersecurity of the United States.114  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) held a 
contract with Booz Allen Hamilton and employed Edward Snowden.115 Booz Allen 
Hamilton is one of the federal government’s largest contractors with over $4 billion in 
federal contracts alone.  In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed national secrets that he had 
gained access to while a subcontractor.  Despite this breach of national security by an 
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outsourced service provided by a federal contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton continues to 
gain federal contracts that tally in the billions.  Recent federal contracts came from the 
U.S. Air Force in the sum of $950 million for one contract.116 The breech of national 
secrets does not seem to have deterred the federal government from awarding more 
contracts to the same company. This alone should be of concern about the national safety 
of the U.S. democracy in the hands of private contractors.  
Constitutional Principles and Private Prison Companies 
     Other concerns that have been raised as more government services are outsourced is 
conflict of interest.  Can private contractors that provide a service for the federal 
government influence government decisions that could provide them with means for 
growth? In an ideal world, the answer would be no.  But, in the dysfunctional world of 
federal contracts for outsourced services, the answer is yes.  In 1983, the U.S. government 
started to outsource its prison services to private prison companies.117 The business of 
prisoners has become quite prosperous.  The correctional facility industry now reachs $5.1 
billion annually as of 2020.118 This industry is influenced by the number of individuals 
incarcerated.  The number incarcerated can be directly influenced by politicians and 
federal bureaucrats that make rules.   
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   Figure 5 
    
Source:  www.prisonlegalnews.org.   
     The largest companies in the private corrections facility industry in the United States 
are Corecivic Inc, the GEO Group Inc, and Management and Training Corp.  Corecivic 
was previously names Corrections Corp of America.  Corrections Corp of America 
diversified the company into building jails, maintaining them, as well as guarding 
prisoner.  With this diversification came a new name, Corecivic Inc.119 Following the 
money, it can be quickly revealed that these private corrections firms have deep pockets 
when it comes to the political area.  Geo Group, Corecivic Inc, and Management and 
Training Corp donated over $3.1 million in political contributions in 2020.120 Figure 5 
shows the political contributions from the top three for profit prison companies. They 
 
119 Devlin Barrett, “Private Prison Firm CCA to Rename Itself Corecivic,”  Wall Street Journal Business. Oct. 
28, 2016, accessed June 22, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-prison-firm-cca-to-rename-
itself-corecivic-1477666800    




spent over $4.5 million for lobbying in 2020. Dividing the total donations of 2020 from 
profit prison to political campaigns the data shows that approximately ten percent of the 
donations went to democrat candidates, leaving approximately ninety percent to 
republican candidates. 
Since the federal and state government are their only customer, the for-profit 
prison companies use part of their billions of revenues to influence government officials 
and politicians. The political contributions made a tremendous jump from 2014 to 2016 
as the stakes got higher.121 Figure 6 shows the increase in political contributions by for 
profit corrections companies.   
Figure 6 
Source: www.opensecrets.org. Accessed 
     The increase in both political contributions and lobbying monies were a result of then 
President Obama’s decision to not renew contracts with for-profit prisons. Presidential 





companies (PPC).122 Political contributions from PPC’s jumped from approximately $600 
thousand in 2014 to over $1.7 million in 2016. Much of these contributions went to 
political action committees (PAC).  The battle over PPC’s is not a new one.  A report 
written in 2011 showed how PPC’s used their large political contributions and employed 
hundreds of lobbyists to influence politicians to promote legislation that would keep their 
beds full.123 The political contributions by PPC’s for the 2020 election year hit a all-time 
high of $3.1 million. Geo Group and Corecivic were the two largest donors.   
     Geo Group has a board of directors consisting of nine individuals.  Three of the 
individuals on the Geo Group Board of Directors have previous employment with either 
the federal government or a state government.124The Board of Directors of Corecivic also 
is comprised of nine individuals.125   Five of the nine Board of Directors of Corecivic were 
previously employed with the federal government in their prior careers.  Board member 
Stacia Hylton a prior Director of U.S. Marshall Service under President Obama. She had 
also held other federal appointments.   She was appointed to Board of Directors of 
Corecivic in August of 2016.  In that same month President Obama awarded Corecivic a 
$1 billion no bid contract to detain asylum seekers that had come from Central America.126  
After the contract had been signed, a judge ruled the action of detaining asylum seekers 
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was illegal.  But the contract with Corecivic had already been signed. They received large 
monthly sums but were not able to legally provide the service they had contracted to do.  
     The process of political donations and lobbying brings about concerns of conflict of 
interest.  Despite laws prohibiting federal contractors from making political contributions, 
it persists. The federal contractors that provide outsourced services continue to seek 
methods to financially promote specific candidates or policies that will help expand their 
business interest.  The Campaign Legal Center (CLC) has been an activist organization to 
report federal contractors that they find have violated the campaign finance laws.127 CLC 
alone reported multiple federal contractor campaign finance violations to the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC).  In 2020 the FEC announced that a Naval Contractor was 
fined for violating federal campaign finance laws.128 The Congressional Leadership Fund, 
a Republican Political Action Committee (PAC) accepted a donation from a federal naval 
contractor.  This in direct violation of FEC rules.  These types of campaign violations are 
not nearly as clear when larger corporations give to a PAC or to a candidate from a 
subsidiary company that they may have a relationship with.  
     Turning the focus in the direction of oversight of government agencies, a report written 
for the National Institute of Justice found that oversight of the PPCs by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (FBoP) was inconsistent at a minimum.129 The PPCs are expected by their 
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contracts to operate their facilities by the same standards that a public facility would.  The 
standards are set by the American Correctional Association (ACA).130 The report written 
by the National Institute of Justice found that the ACA standards are a dichotomy.131  The 
ACA standards are focused on procedures. The standards are not in place to evaluate the 
outcomes of the procedures. The report noted that two different facilities can be compliant 
to ACA standards, but the outcome of each of those prisons function may vary 
tremendously. This report also found out that “government practices of monitoring 
privately operated facilities vary widely.”132  In facilities that were contracted by states, 
48% had full time contract monitors.  This is compared to less than ten percent of federally 
contracted private run prisons having full time contract monitors.  This leaves a private 
company wielding the responsibility of a federal agency that has little oversight. The 
political checks and balance system as it applies here is very inconsistent.  And at the 
political methods utilized as means to perpetuate its growth are a direct conflict of interest.  
Another concern with privatization of government services is transparency.  Most federal 
government agencies have the legal responsibility of transparency.  Unfortunately, private 
contractors for the federal government do not have to comply with the Freedom of 
Information Act (FoIA) that was signed in 1966.  This leaves the public in the dark about 
the company, procedures, employees, and how the taxpayers’ money is being spent.  
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Private Military Support 
     The democratic process in the United States encompasses specific characteristics that 
allow it to remain democratic in nature.  The people rule themselves to some degree 
through elected representatives.  Transparency of the government is a fundamental 
principle in democracy.  In the checks and balance of the United States, one of the 
responsibilities of Congress is the oversight of federal agency spending and performance.  
How does this process unfold when government defense contractors are hired?  The 
government-controlled defense was developed when the nation- state concept developed.  
Prior to that armies were privately organized.133 The notion that the government has the 
monopoly on the use of force and defense was interspersed with the growth of the nation-
state concept.134 In more recent times the outsourcing of defense services, equipment, and 
technology has become common. In 2008 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were 
approximately 147,000 U.S. Armed Forced deployed to Iraq.  During this same period 
there were approximately 150,000 Department of Defense (DOD) contractors in the same 
region.  
     A report completed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) there were 
specific concerns that related to Congressional oversight135. There were nine specific 
concerns with the operation. GAO had two specific issues related to DOD contractors:” 
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(1) guidance and plans for the reposturing of contractors from Iraq; (2) accountability and 
disposition of contractor-managed government-owned property.”  GAO also stated, “We 
believe that without more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not be able to 
effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities.”  The reposturing would include the 
coordination of private contractors, withdrawing 173,00 pieces of equipment worth $16.5 
billion, and closing of 311 instillations that had been in use for over 5 years. This was to 
be accomplished while GAO had concerns there was lack of Congressional oversight.136  
     The Department of Defense (DOD) is the federal agency that has the largest number 
of outsourced private contractors.137 The budget of DOD alone was $404.5 billion in 
2019.138  It increased by more than 10% in 2020 to $445.5 billion. In 2019 the total budget 
for defense related spending alone was $676 million.  Nearly half of the total defense 
budget was for Pentagon related defense contracting, $370 billion.  The number of defense 
contractors in the Middle East were down from 2008 to 53,000 U.S. contractors and 
35,000 U.S. military troops in 2019139.   Although the number of U.S. military contractors 
has decreased the process of Congressional oversight remains in disarray.   
     Despite the massive budget of the DOD, the world of defense contracting has been 
riddled with scandals of fraud, abusive treatment of prisoners, and killing of innocent 
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civilians.140 There is no clear process of oversight of federal contractors that are acting as 
an extension of the U.S. military. Congress has the authority to have individuals or specific 
industry executive answer questions under oath.  This can be a cumbersome and somewhat 
unrealistic process of oversight with up to 150,000 individual contractors to oversee.    
     The prosecution of security guards that worked for Blackwater, USA in 2014 was a 
rare case in which a federal defense contractor was held accountable for actions while 
employed for private defense company.  The incident took place at Nisur Square in 
Baghdad where 14 innocent civilians were shot by private defense contractors employed 
by Blackwater, USA.141  Private military contractors had been called “untouchables” with 
no process in place for accountability for crimes committed while private contractors.142  
Blackwater U.S.A.  has been fined over $50 million for misconduct.143  In 2010, 
Blackwater U.S.A. was fined$ 42 million for “firearms violations-State Department 
Settlement”. Again in 2012 they were fined $7.5 million for “firearms violations-deferred 
prosecution agreement”.   
     Blackwater U.S.A. has changed its name after 2007 scandal with Nasir Square incident. 
The new company is now part of Constellis Group.   Constellis Group was awarded the 
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Department of State Global Protective Services contract worth $3.7 billion in 2016.144 The 
DOD’s use of private military contractors is widespread and a longstanding policy, but it 
lacks transparency, oversight, and accountability which are cornerstones to the U.S. 
democratic process.  
     In 2019, the DoD announced that the agency had implemented new procedures to try 
to reign in any chances of fraud from federal contractors.145 Shortly after the 
announcement a company that had signed a federal contract to provide spare parts to the 
DoD was prosecuted for false claims, defrauding the DoD, and tax evasion.146 The 
business owner not only had misrepresented his companies’ ability to provide the exact 
parts needed, he also coordinated efforts for other family members to start companies with 
the purpose of defrauding the federal government by gaining federal contracts.  The parts 
that the business owner lied about were needed for military fighter jets and helicopters.  
He was sentenced to 36 months in prison (likely run by a PPC) and $1.1 million fine.  
     Over the last 30 years, the DoD has used defense contractors to support the U.S. troops.  
The support of the defense contractors can be from large corporations that provide military 
planes and equipment to individuals that are contracted for private military support.  Over 
8,000 private military contractors have died supporting U.S. troops in the Middle East 
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since 2001.  The top companies under federal contract that provide equipment, electronics, 
and defense systems are Lockheed Martin, Boeing Company, Raytheon Company, 
General Dynamics Corporation, and Northrop Grumman Corp. Lockheed Martin alone 
has had 91 instances of misconduct while under federal contract.147 In August of 2007, 
Lockheed Martin was fined $265 million for “self-reported F 35 overbilling.” In 2006 
they were fined $27,000.00 for federal election law violations.  In 2015, Lockheed Martin 
was fined $4.79 million for “using federal funds for lobbying.”148 In 2000 they were fined 
$13 million for “space launch information transferred to China (Arms Export Act 
Violation)”149 The list for Lockheed Martin goes on and on.  Most recent violation is in 
2020 and the penalty is still pending.  Boeing Company has 83 instances of misconduct 
since 1995.  Those violations range from breaking federal law by using Russian titanium 
to a $54 million fine for delivering defective Chinook Helicopters.150 
     But they and other many other companies continue to gain federal contracts for the 
DoD and other agencies despite these offenses that are available publicly.  The 
Congressional oversight and agency oversight appears to be nonexistent. How does this 
happen? Political Action Committees (PAC) and individuals associated with the defense 
sector donated more than $27 million to political candidates.151  The money given to PACs 
supported more republicans than democrats.  Lockheed Martin despite being fined at least 
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twice for violations of the U.S. political system continued to donate in the 2019-2020 
election cycle to the sum of $6.02 million.  The defense industry put $102 million of their 
money into lobbying in 2020.   
     Despite any potential attempts to control federally awarded contracts, there is 
legislation that outlines how federal contractors are to be evaluated. The evaluating and 
recording process is utilized in the process of awarding federal contracts. Federal law 
requires annual evaluations of contractors.152 The government data base known as Past 
Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) and Federal Awardee Performance 
and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) store data from agency evaluations of federal 
contractors.  The evaluations address the quality of product provided, compliance with 
schedules, conduct of management, and efforts to control costs.  This annual evaluation 
process is to be done with federal contracts that are valued at $150,000 or more.  
Conclusion 
   The purpose of this paper was to look at how federal agencies outsource government 
functions and how that intersects with U.S. democracy core principles of government 
transparency, integrity, and accountability.  Transparency is a fundamental principle of 
the U.S. democracy.  It allows private citizens the right to view how the federal 
government is spending money and the outcomes of that spending.  That right has been 
solidified through the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) of 1966.  When agencies 
outsource to private companies the FoIA does not apply.  Citizens in turn are denied access 
 
152 Congressional Research Service. Evaluating the “Past Performance” of Federal Contractors:  Legal 
Requirements and Issues. February 15, 2015. 
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to records and outcomes produced by the private companies.  Through a search of the 
internet inquisitive citizens can find which companies were given federal contract monies, 
but there is no path to find out how that taxpayer money has been utilized by a private 
company.  Nor do citizens have access to the outcomes produced using the taxpayer 
dollars that federal contracted companies spent. This lack of transparency can lead to poor 
oversight and loss of integrity of services.  Although citizens may not have direct access 
to how federal contractors are spending taxpayer money, Congress has provided 
legislation that specifically outlines how and when federal agencies are required to 
evaluate the performance of contractors.  This information in turn can be utilized by 
agencies in the bid process for choosing federal contractors.   
     When inquiring with CMS (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) about how 
many TJC (The Joint Commission) facilities were audited in 2020, a void can be found.  
TJC via email and telephone conversation states that they do not have that information to 
share with the public.  CMS via email and multiple telephone conversations state that the 
agency is not aware of that data and suggested contacting TJC.  So, TJC is not legally 
responsible to be transparent to citizens and the agency that is responsible for overseeing 
TJC does not have the data.  They and other certifying organizations can set rules more 
restricting than CMS for certification without those rules being viewed by Congress.  This 
bypasses the process set forth in the APA and congressional oversight.  Despite this lack 
of transparency and bypassing the rulemaking process of the APA, healthcare facilities 




    The use of PPC’s for housing of prisoners fails all three principle tests when applying 
transparency, integrity, and accountability to the DOJ’s process of outsourcing.  The 
common theme of lack of transparency holds true for PPCs, because they are private 
companies.  The lack of accountability was noted in how PPC facilities are monitored.  
The lack of data on the outcomes from their facilities is staggering.  The monies donated 
for political candidates through subsidiary companies and the millions of dollars put 
towards lobbying speak to the company’s ability to influence federal contracts and policy 
making.  The potential for pay-for-play although illegal, appears to alive and well in the 
modern administrative state. In this section it can be seen how federal contract negotiation 
by the government can cost billions of dollars as it did with Corecivic and the no bid 
contract for $1billion it received in from the federal government inf 2016.  
     Applying the standards of integrity, transparency, and oversight to the federal defense 
contracts can leave people in a state of dismay.  Despite numerous abuses by contracting 
companies with fines racking up in the millions, they continue to be awarded federal 
contracts.  Despite prosecutions for civilian deaths and cruel and inhumane treatment of 
Abu Ghraib prisoners, private military companies continue to be awarded federal 
contracts for protective services by federal agencies.153   Although federal contractor 
companies have been acknowledged for having hundreds of violations with only looking 
at three specific companies and costing millions of dollars in fines, they continue to be 
awarded federal contracts.  
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    The services and protections provided by the administrative state are essential to daily 
life of most Americans.  The demands on the federal government to supply more all the 
while demanding that it be done with less, has led to outsourcing of some basic 
government functions.  It could be argued that the administrative state has not diminished 
in size.  But rather, much of the administrative state has become privatized.  The concerns 
that come from this increase in privatizing some of the core functions of most federal 
agencies has revealed many shortcomings.  From a pure public administration outlook, 
the present policy of outsourcing is not efficient because it is not actually cost efficient. 
The lack of oversight perpetuates fraud and abuses. When the present use of privatization 
of federal agency functions if viewed through the lens of the U.S. democracy, it becomes 
more complex.  Not only should the federally outsourced products and services be 
expected to be efficient and cost effective by a public administration model, they should 
also be entwined with the democratic process.    
     The cases presented in this paper is not meant to imply that all agencies lack oversight 
or integrity.  It does not imply that all private companies under federal contract are making 
their own rules without congressional approval.  But until we clearly acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the present system, we will not be able to find a solution to those 
problems. 
    The expansion of services that federal agencies are expected to provide have left them 
lacking in expertise in many areas. In a study of over 300 federal managers, the responses 
showed that a main reason for outsourcing of agency responsibilities was to gain “unique 
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and in-demand skill sets.”154  Agencies have expanded missions and budgetary limitations 
that lead them to seek private companies to provide services.  The Department of Defense 
outsourcing of its IT service contractors was $17.8 billion in 2019.155 
     Congress has the power of oversight by utilizing congressional committee hearings or 
passing statutes to expand or retract agency authority.  Congress can also use the power 
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     This paper addresses the question, has the federal bureaucracy as it functions in 
contemporary American been able to maintain constitutional principles?   The paper 
focused on the constitutional principles of citizen involvement in decision-making, 
accountability of the government to the people, and transparency.  To answer this 
question, each chapter posed a unique question that independently may not provide 
enough information to answer the larger question.  But the cumulative data from all three 
chapters very conclusive finds the answer to that question to be no. 
     At a superficial level, Woodrow Wilson’s Theory of Public Administration might seem 
harmless.  His theory was a method to have the business of the government conducted.  
But public administration is different than business administration.  The stumbling block 
to his theory is the U.S. Constitution.  Dwight Waldo had the foresight to understand the 
potential difficulties that might ensue with an administrative arm of the federal 
government when held up to the light of the Constitution. 
      This paper clearly shown three important facts.  First, there is political bias within the 
federal bureaucracy.  Second, the bureaucrats making the rules do not clearly understand 
whom they are regulating.  These same bureaucrats do not think highly of the average 
citizen.  From a statistical perspective, the political affiliation of most of the bureaucrats 
is different than the political affiliation of the majority of the general population. Third, 
the modern administrative state in many cases is no longer able to perform its duties.  The 
amount of outsourcing or privatizing of government services is tremendous by any 
standard and lacks any formal process of accountability.  
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      It appears the average American and most politicians have accepted that the federal 
bureaucracy is a necessary branch of the federal government.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has validated the federal bureaucracy and secured the preference of federal agency 
interpretation of vague statutes with Chevron U.S.A. Inc v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc (1984).156 In more recent times Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency (2007) the Supreme Court ruled that a federal agency does have to follow a statute 
when directed.157  A federal agency cannot, not provide a regulation that is requested in a 
statute.  With that being agreed upon, it only seems reasonable that the federal bureaucracy 
should be expected to function in a manner aligned with constitutional principles.   
     The survey discussed in chapter three reveals the rule makers do not seem to care what 
the rule followers think about the rules they make.  An attitude like that may be acceptable 
in a monarchy or other forms of government.  But, in a constitutional republic like the 
United States, the will of the people is paramount. Bureaucrats with that kind of an attitude 
are not in alignment with the philosophy on which the United States was built. 
     The lack of accountability and oversight by Congress can be seen in all chapters.  
Chapter one displays that federal agencies have the capacity to function in a politically 
bias manner despite supposed congressional oversight.  Chapter three shows that with 
outsourcing, the oversight process has been diluted even more.  It appears that 
Congressional oversight is predominately limited to putting out fires when scandals 
surface.  A more direct approach to congressional oversight such as a bipartisan committee 
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could be developed with the sole purpose of overseeing the final regulations that agencies 
develop.  Once reviewed by the committee, the proposed regulation could be presented to 
Congress to vote on.  This accomplishes direct accountability by Congress about the 
appropriateness of the regulation.  This method would also allow the general public to 
hold their members of Congress accountable for their voting record on specific 
regulations. 
     The lack of transparency which is such a fundamental core of the U.S. constitutional 
republic has all but disappeared with the use of private companies to conduct the business 
of the government.  Despite the Freedom of Information Act, basic details and conditions 
about how private companies contracted by the federal government function are not 
available to the citizenry.  
     Waldo’s description of an administrative arm of the government that must understand 
the will of the state, and then perform their services with the will of the state as guidance 
is very different than the federal bureaucracy of the 21st century in America.  Waldo was 
concerned because there was no clear-cut method to reconcile the federal bureaucracy.  
Here we are many decades later and still struggling with how to reconcile a federal 
bureaucracy with democratic values.  
     If this paper does nothing else, the hope is it will bring light to the fact that the modern-
day administrative state does no conduct business in a manner that upholds democratic 
principles.  This paper by no means represents all federal agencies and bureaucrats.  But 
what it does provide is evidence enough that large sectors of the administrative state do 
not conduct the business of government with oversight, transparency, nor citizen input.  
However, these concerns can be addressed with reform. 
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     Reform of what, the federal bureaucracy, or Congress?  Maybe reform of both? Some 
might agree that reform of both the federal bureaucracy and Congress is appropriate.  
What would reform of the federal bureaucracy look like? Perhaps more in services should 
be provided to tell federal employees not to think, talk, act, or promote any services or 
regulations that are stem from their personal ideology.  Although much of this is already 
performed with federal employees, there is likely room for improvement.  But what would 
this type of reform do for constitutional problems such as lack of oversight with 
outsourcing?  
     If there is transparency in government affairs but lack of citizen review, it serves no 
purpose.  Americans have the privilege to be able to participate in their governance.  
Reform could come in the form of citizens writing, calling, or emailing their congressional 
representatives to hold them accountable.  They could request oversight hearings or push 
for clarification of legislative language. Citizens can initiate litigation that can hold the 
government accountable.  Individuals can sue an agency individually or join a special 
interest group’s lawsuit.  This is one method of self-governance and oversight that sets the 
United States apart from many other countries.  Changing how Americans think and 
participate in government requires re-educating them.  Presently, many Americans see the 
government as a paternalistic government.  Not the citizen representative form of 
government it is designed to be.  Changing this perception and encouraging participation 
in the government process could produce many changes in the function of the federal 
government. 
     Setting sights on congressional reform might bring out more robust results than the 
previous.  Congress holds the key to two very important steps in the rulemaking process.  
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First, Congress grants authority to federal agencies to develop defined regulations.  
Second, congressional oversight is the key to accountability within the federal agencies 
and the way they conduct business.  Some scholars believe that reforming Congress is one 
step upon which to deconstruct the massive administrative state.158  True, there might be 
more adherence to constitutional principles if Congress had better oversight of agencies.  
Federal agencies, like children are more likely to perform better if they know that there is 
structure and oversight.159  But without consistent oversight, the chances of adhering to 
basic constitutional principles diminishes.   
     Congress in theory can stop authorizing federal agencies to produce regulations.  But 
why would they do that?  Congress could uphold its constitutional responsibility of 
producing necessary legislation.  Yes, it is a cumbersome process. The process for 
legislation to be passed through Congress include introduction, committee referral, 
referral to the body of Congress, and floor debates.  Both bodies of Congress handle bills 
in different ways.  The Framers made the legislative pathway slow and arduous to prevent 
an overly zealous federal government from overpowering individual or state rights.160 
     The chances of reforming Congress in the 21st century is very unlikely.  Although the 
structure of Congress may not have changed a lot in the last decades, the centralizing of 
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the power to the Speaker of the House from committees has changed the functional 
dynamics.  The days are gone that powerful bipartisan congressional committees would 
bring bills up to the Speaker of the House to present to the floor for vote. Asking for 
reform of Congress is asking them to self-regulate.  They have no reason. 
     The highly polarized partisan politics of modern times have also made it more difficult 
to regulate Congress by the election process.  The leadership of both major political parties 
have decades of service in Congress.  These career politicians wield tremendous influence 
and money to maintain their positions.  It is a rare case in which an incumbent with 
decades of being in Congress loses an election.  Specifically in these polarized times, 
where voters are less likely to remove powerful incumbents unless there have egregious 
violations of law or ethics.   
     If Americans were lucky enough to make donkeys fly and congressional to reform to 
take place, it would still do nothing to provide structural pathway that is constitutional for 
all federal agencies to conduct business.  This situation resembles a dysfunctional family 
that will not talk about the “elephant in the room.” The parents do not want to discuss it 
because they do not know how to handle it or don’t like confrontation.  Because the 
parents do not address the problem and provide guidance and structure to their children, 
they will most likely continue to display behavior problems.   
     In this hypothetical scenario, the U.S. political system at large are the parents.  The 
administrative state are the children.  The children are misbehaving because they lack the 
necessary guidance and structure that the Constitution can provide.  At the present time, 
the bureaucracy is misbehaving as has been shown in this paper.  There does not seem to 
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be active conversation about an overhaul of the federal bureaucracy. That might be 
because those that can introduce that topic are busy trying to gain power over it instead. 
     It seems oddly simple that a constitutional amendment could provide a solution to the 
federal bureaucracies’ lack of constitutional principles.  Woodrow Wilson thought the 
Constitution was an obstacle to his new theory to remake the federal government.161  He 
thought the U.S. Constitution was, “insufficiently democratic and overly suspicious of the 
popular will.”162  President Wilson did not attempt to amend the Constitution to embrace 
his theory and provide the necessary structure for federal bureaucracy. Instead, he 
implemented his plan without constitutional guidance’s. It appears that the American 
people, for the most part have accepted with naivety the federal bureaucracy because of 
all the services and securities it provides.  
     But as this paper has shown, the lack of concern about the will of the people, the lack 
of accountability, and lack of oversight have led to what appears at times an autonomous 
federal administration that has very few control mechanisms.  The hundreds of billions of 
dollars spent by agencies to privatize government services with no transparency is more 
than the average American can conceive.  
     A constitutional amendment could be written that could embrace the federal 
bureaucracy.  This may seem like a lofty goal.   But history has shown us that when the 
Articles of Confederation did not properly represent the nation that the United States was 
become, leaders organized and wrote the Constitution.  Embedded in the Constitution is 
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the method to amend it as times and circumstances change.    This process has taken place 
twenty-seven times in the history of this nation.  A committee could be organized that 
resembled the constitutional convention.  Two leaders from all states could gather to 
design the 4th branch of government with the constitutional principles embedded in it. This 
is no easy feat. But in the history of the United States, citizens have pushed members of 
Congress to amend the Constitution for other matters of urgency such as civil rights.  
Discussion on how to design the structure for the federal bureaucracy might find that some 
of the services provided by federal agencies could be better managed by State 
governments.   
    It appears that the administrative state is functioning in some sort of organized chaos.  
It has grown to the point that some agencies can no longer effectively do their jobs without 
assistance from private companies. In many cases, it no longer adheres to the democratic 
values that are fundamental to the United States.  It is time for change. 
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